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THE NEW ROLE OF COERCION IN ANTITRUST
JEAN WEGMAN BURNS*
With the ascendancy of the economic efficiency approach and its emphasis on
competitive prices and output, coercion-the use of force or threat; to compel
another to act against one's will-seemingly no longer has a role to play in anti-
trust analysis Professor Burns argues that coercion is indeed still relevant in
antitrust analysis, though its role has changed from the central character it once
played in the early antitrust cases. After analyzing the evolving role of coercion,
Professor Burns concludes that the concept is still useful in vertical restraints and
tie-ins in distinguishing between efficient restraints and inefficient ones and in
evaluating the antitrust-injury standing requirement
INTRODUCTION
C OERCION has been an elusive presence in antitrust jurisprudence
for years. At times it has been a dominant player, taking center
stage in the determination of legality or illegality. At other times, it lurks
in the background as just one more "factor," having some unspecified
relevance but not determinative in itself. At still other times, it vanishes
altogether.
During the past fifteen years, the Supreme Court has increasingly
moved toward an economic-efficiency-based antitrust philosophy. Given
the recent rise to prominence of this approach, the question naturally
arises: What is the remaining role, if any, for coercion in antitrust doc-
trine? At first blush, the answer seems simple. Coercion appears to be
an anachronism, a relic of the bygone days of "trader freedom" and
"buyer autonomy." Under the economic efficiency approach, with its
emphasis on competitive prices and output, coercion would seem to have
no role whatsoever. Indeed, the proponents of economic efficiency the-
ory tend to eschew any test for legality that turns on state of mind, par-
ticularly the state of mind of the defendant. Instead, they construct tests
of legality that turn on "hard" facts like market definition and market
power.'
This article does not join in the debate over whether the Supreme
Court or lower courts should or should not adopt an economic efficiency
approach. Enough volleys have already been launched in that battle.2
* Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University; J.D.
1973, University of Chicago; B.A. 1970, Vanderbilt University.
1. See infra note 109 and accompanying text.
2. A sampling of the books and articles in this debate include: R. Bork, The Anti-
trust Paradox (1978); R. Posner, Antitrust Law: An Economic Perspective (1976) [here-
inafter R. Posner, Antitrust Law]; Barnes, Nonefficiency Goals in the Antitrust Law of
Mergers, 30 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 787 (1989); Curran, Beyond Economic Concepts and
Categories: A Democratic Refiguration of Antitrust Law, 31 St. Louis U.L.J 349 (1987);
DeBow, The Social Costs of Populist Antitrust: A Public Choice Perspective, 14 Harv. J.L.
& Pub. Pol'y 205 (1991); Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 1 (1984);
Fox, The Modernization of Antitrust: A New Equilibrium, 66 Cornell L. Rev. 1140
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Rather, this article starts with the premise that the ship has sailed, that
the Supreme Court already has, by and large, come to view antitrust
from an economic perspective. Given this reality, this article explores
the questions: Assuming a continued adherence to an economic ap-
proach, can we eliminate coercion as a factor for consideration? And, if
so, would this be a good result? Put another way, does coercion still have
a helpful role to play in antitrust analysis?
This article concludes that while coercion does not have-and has
never had-a role in horizontal restraints, it continues to play a signifi-
cant role in vertical restraints and in tying. What that role is, however,
has changed with the ascendancy of the economic efficiency approach.
Part I of the article explores the role of coercion (or, more accurately, its
non-role) in horizontal restraints. Part II of the article explores the very
central role that coercion played in the early vertical pricing, territorial,
and customer restraint cases. This Part demonstrates that evidence of
coercion was intricately connected with the rationale for condemning
certain vertical restraints, the "agreement" element, and standing. Part
III of the article explores the vertical restraint cases after the ascendancy
of the economic efficiency approach to antitrust. The first section of this
part reviews the Supreme Court's seeming elimination of coercion from
all aspects of vertical restraint analysis. The second section of Part III
demonstrates, however, that coercion still has a role to play. It is no
longer the reason for condemning vertical pricing, territorial, or cus-
tomer restraints, but it is now evidence of just the sort of restraint that
economic efficiency advocates condemn. Part IV of the article traces the
role of coercion in the early tying cases and, like Part II, shows the piv-
otal role that coercion played.' Part V parallels Part III in exploring the
evidentiary role that is left for coercion in tying analysis, assuming a con-
tinued adherence to an economic efficiency approach. Once again, the
conclusion here is that while superficially coercion seems to have been
eliminated from much of tying analysis, coercion evidence, in fact, is rele-
vant as a way of assisting in sorting out economically efficient ties from
inefficient ones. Next, Part VI responds to the skeptic's questions of
(1981); Fox & Sullivan, Antitrust-Retrospective and Prospective: Where Are We Coming
From? Where Are We Going?, 62 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 936 (1987).
3. For ease, vertical restraints in the form of resale-price, territory, or customer limi-
tations will be dealt with in Parts II and III, while tying arrangements will be considered
in Parts IV and V. Vertical restraints (in the form of vertical pricing, territory, and
customer restrictions) and tying arrangements are both vertical restraints in the sense
that both affect (and usually limit) the freedom of choice of a party on another level of the
distribution chain. They differ, however, in that tying arrangements, unlike purely verti-
cal restraints, are also said to harm competitors on the tying seller's level-rivals in the
tied market from whom customers can no longer buy. While a vertical price or territorial
restraint may have harmful horizontal effects, see infra notes 66-67 and accompanying
text, these harmful effects are borne by buyers and society at large, not rivals of the
restraint-imposing manufacturer. Furthermore, while there is some overlap, the law gov-
erning these two types of restraint has taken largely different paths. For these reasons,
tying restraints will be considered separately from the purely vertical restraints.
[Vol. 60
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whether we really need to use coercion evidence and whether there might
not be substantial dangers in reintroducing coercion as a factor in the
antitrust calculus. Finally, this article concludes that, even under an eco-
nomic efficiency approach, coercion does indeed have a useful role to
play in antitrust analysis. A court wishing to adhere to an economically-
based approach ought not throw out the baby of coercion with the bath
water of the earlier, non-economic approach. Rather, courts need to rec-
ognize that the role of coercion has changed. Its new role is different but
no less important.
I. COERCION IN HORIZONTAL RESTRAINTS
Although coercion has in the past often played a prominent role in
antitrust cases, it has never played a part in purely horizontal restraints.'
No part of the horizontal violation-the rationale for condemning the
activity, the agreement element, or the plaintiff's standing-depends on
the presence or absence of coercion.
The primary rationale for condemning horizontal agreements to fix
prices or divide territories or customers is, of course, that such restraints
permit otherwise competitive firms to raise prices or restrict output.5
While the anti-competitive effect of the restraint is borne by the buyers,
the coercion of the buyers plays no part in determining the legality or
illegality of the activity.6 A horizontal agreement to fix prices, for exam-
4. The garden-variety horizontal arrangement involves competitors on the same
commercial level of different brands agreeing to prices to be charged or dividing territo-
ries or customers. In this section, I am using "horizontal restraint" to refer to such an
interbrand restraint. While there can be intrabrand horizontal restraints (where, for in-
stance, the dealers of the same brand of merchandise agree to fix prices), such an in-
trabrand arrangement will not (unless the particular brand has a monopoly position in
the market) likely affect output in the interbrand market. See H. Hovenkamp, Econom-
ics and Federal Antitrust Law § 9.2, at 249-50 (1985) [hereinafter H. Hovenkamp, Eco-
nomics]; Liebeler, Intrabrand "Cartels" Under GTE Sylvania, 30 UCLA L. Rev. 1, 18-19
(1982). I am also excluding boycotts from "horizontal restraint." Boycotts may be
purely horizontal, purely vertical, or partly horizontal and partly vertical. The role, if
any, that coercion plays in boycott analysis depends largely on which type of boycott is
involved. See infra notes 8, 10, 19 & 125.
5. This is, of course, assuming that the conspiring firms collectively have market
power. Absent combined market shares that give rise to market power, the conspiring
firms will be unable to raise prices or restrict output, because buyers will simply turn
elsewhere for the product. For this reason, Richard Posner argues that the law ought not
waste its time and resources trying to break up what will be futile horizontal restraints
among firms that collectively lack market power. See R. Posner, Antitrust Law, supra
note 2, at 41-42. Contra L. Sullivan, Handbook of the Law of Antitrust 192 (1977) ("it is
now settled that in price fixing cases no question whatsoever is to be asked about the
defendants' power if their purpose is to fix prices or if their conduct ... will be to affect
market price"). In FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990), the
Supreme Court seemingly rejected Posner's argument and stated that a showing of mar-
ket power was not necessary to condemn a horizontal price-fixing agreement. See id. at
434-36. The Court's statement in Trial Lawyers, however, was arguably dicta because in
that case there was some showing of actual effect on the market, which would be possible
only if the combining lawyers had market power. See id. at 419-20.
6. Since 1927, the Supreme Court has treated horizontal price-fixing asperse illegal.
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ple, is illegal even if some or all buyers willingly pay the higher prices.7
Rather, the illegality of the horizontal activity depends wholly on the
acts of the conspiring parties and not on the resistance or nonresistance
of the buyers.'
See United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 396-401 (1927). The rule re-
mains the same today. See Trial Lawyers, 493 U.S. at 432-36; Arizona v. Maricopa
County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 348 (1982); Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446
U.S. 643, 648-49 (1980) (per curiam). The Court has similarly held horizontal territorial
divisions to be per se illegal. See Palmer v. BRG of Georgia, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 401, 402-03
(1990) (per curiam); United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 606-08 (1972);
United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350, 356-58 (1967).
A horizontal restraint may escape per se condemnation and be judged under the rule of
reason if the firms can show a pro-competitive reason for coordinating their pricing or
other market activity. In so holding, however, the Supreme Court has indicated that
what it is looking for is evidence that the horizontal restraint lowers prices or increases
output. See NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 107-08, 114-15 (1984); Broadcast
Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1979). Under this ap-
proach, the state of mind of the buyer/victim plays no part in the rule of reason analysis
(other than in the obvious assumption that all buyers want lower prices).
7. See, e.g., Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. American Soc'y of Composers, 620 F.2d
930, 935 (2d Cir. 1980) ("even customer preference cannot save some practices from
illegality under the antitrust law"), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 970 (1981); In re Mid-Atlantic
Toyota Antitrust Litig., 560 F. Supp. 760, 786 n.40 (D. Md. 1983) ("consumers' injury
arises not from an 'unwanted' purchase of the [product]"). In one sense, anyone who
buys does so willingly. Those persons who are unwilling to pay the higher price will
switch to substitutes or forego the product altogether. See VII P. Areeda, Antitrust Law:
An Analysis of Antitrust Principles and Their Application 1451a (1986); Slawson, A
New Concept of Competition: Reanalyzing Tie-In Doctrine After Hyde, 30 Antitrust Bull.
257, 270-75 (1985).
8. A boycott can take a number of configurations. A completely horizontal boycott,
where the boycotting parties are on the same commercial level as the victim, see, e.g.,
Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963) (boycotting firms were members of
stock exchange and victims two over-the-counter broker-dealers); Northwest Wholesale
Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing, 472 U.S. 284 (1985) (boycotting coopera-
tive comprised of retailers and victim former member of cooperative), is like a horizontal
restraint in that the victim's state of mind plays no part in determining the legality or
illegality of the concerted refusal to deal. Other boycotts involve horizontal boycotting
firms but the "victim" of the boycott is on a different commercial level. See, e.g., Trial
Lawyers, 493 U.S. 411 (boycotting lawyers and victim District of Columbia government);
FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986) (boycotting party dentists and
victims insurers). Here again, the boycott functions like a garden-variety horizontal re-
straint in that the illegality stems from the anti-competitive activity of the boycotting
firms and not from the resistance of the victim who, like the buyer from a horizontal
cartel, is coerced in some sense.
On the other hand, coercion does play a role in the boycott offense when the boycott is
partly vertical-such as when horizontally-conspiring boycotters are influencing an actor
on a different commercial level (typically a supplier or customer) not to deal with a com-
petitor of the boycotting group. See, e.g., Fashion Originators' Guild of Am. v. FTC, 312
U.S. 457 (1941) (garment and textile manufacturers boycotted retailers who sold gar-
ments made by competing "style pirating" manufacturers). Because unilateral action is
legal under § I of the Sherman Act, coercion of the "tool" of the boycotters is relevant to
the issue of legality. Put another way, if the purported tool of the boycotters has unilater-
ally chosen not to deal with the victim of the boycott, there is no illegality. See, e.g.,
Consolidated Metal Prods., Inc. v. American Petroleum Inst., 846 F.2d 284, 291-92 (5th
Cir. 1988) (no illegal boycott where buyers remain free to buy plaintiff's product or those
of alleged boycotting competitors). For recent discussions of the boycott cases, see Bru-
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Similarly, the agreement element in the horizontal restraint does not
involve coercion for the simple reason that the horizontal scheme, if suc-
cessful, benefits all participants.9 All co-conspirators, whether they are
fixing prices or dividing territories or customers, will realize supra-com-
petitive profits through the horizontal plan.' ° Thus, the horizontal plan
can truly be said to be a "common" plan, one in which all participants
have a unity of purpose." Further, precisely because all participating
firms so obviously benefit from a horizontal restraint,' 2 courts are un-
sympathetic to pleas of coercion from cartel members.' 3 In the rare case
net & Sweeney, Integrating Antitrust Procedure and Substance After Northwest Whole-
sale Stationers." Evolving Antitrust Approaches to Pleadings, Burden of Proof and
Boycotts, 72 Va. L. Rev. 1015, 1038-44 (1986); McQuinn, Boycott Law After Northwest
Wholesale Stationers, 57 Antitrust L.J. 839, 840-45 (1989).
9. A horizontal cartel will also benefit non-conspiring rivals of the conspirators be-
cause the conspiracy will raise prices in the market and the non-conspiring rival will get
the benefit of these higher prices. See Blair & Maurer, Umbrella Pricing and Antitrust
Standing: An Economic Analysis, 1982 Utah L. Rev. 763, 764; Page, The Scope of Liabil-
ity for Antitrust Violations, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 1445, 1490 (1985) [hereinafter Page, The
Scope of Liability]. Indeed, because of the benefit reaped by the non-conspiring rival, the
latter likely lacks standing in the form of antitrust injury to challenge the cartel. See
Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 110 S. Ct. 1884, 1900-01 (1990) (Stevens,
J., dissenting); P. Areeda & H. Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Antitrust
Principles and Their Application 340.2c (1991 Supp.).
10. By entering into a cartel, the conspiring firms combine their market power,
thereby mimicking a monopolist and, like a monopolist, are able to restrict output and
raise prices. See H. Hovenkamp, Economics, supra note 4, § 4.1, at 83. A horizontal or
partly horizontal boycott functions similarly. The members of a boycott who are on the
same commercial level will all benefit through the collective agreement not to deal with
the victim. Although a party on another economic level, whether a victim or a tool of the
boycotters, may well be coerced, the members of the boycotting group all benefit from the
joint action. To the extent the plaintiff alleges a purely vertical boycott-a boycott in
which the only "agreements" are between members of different economic levels-the
boycott is more akin to a vertical restraint and the "agreement" may well be coerced. See
infra note 125.
11. The Supreme Court described the agreement in a horizontal arrangement as "a
unity of purpose or a common design and understanding, or a meeting of minds in an
unlawful arrangement." American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 810
(1946). A key question in many horizontal cases is whether parallel action by competi-
tors is a sign of a commitment to a common plan. See Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United
States, 306 U.S. 208, 226-27 (1939); Theatre Enters. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp.,
346 U.S. 537, 540-41 (1954).
12. The participant in a horizontal conspiracy will certainly have a motive to cheat on
the conspiracy (and may have to be coerced into not cheating). If a cartel member can
secretly make sales at a price below the cartel price, that member will be able to sell more
units (because his price is lower) and consequently increase his profits. Even the cheater,
however, wants the other firms to continue to act in concert; only the existence of the
cartel allows the cheater to make supra-competitive profits. Because of the temptation to
cheat and the likely new market entrants, some commentators say a horizontal conspir-
acy carries the seeds of its own destruction. See, e.g., H. Hovenkamp, Economics, supra
note 4, § 4.1, at 91 ("[a]s a result of all these difficulties cartels do not last long"); R.
Posner, Antitrust Law, supra note 2, at 51-55 (clandestine cartel contains "inheritable
self-destructive tendencies").
13. See, eg., United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 161 (1948)
("There is some suggestion ... that large exhibitors ... fathered the illegal practices and
forced them onto the defendants .... [A]cquiescence in an illegal scheme is as much a
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in which a competitor alleges that he was coerced into joining a horizon-
tal conspiracy, such coercion-the means of effecting the agreement-in
no way negates the existence of the agreement or excuses the coerced
firm's ultimate participation.'4
The standing of a buyer to bring a private action is, likewise, unrelated
to the issue of coercion in the purely horizontal restraint.' 5 The buyer
(who had no part of the horizontal conspiracy)' 6 is not disqualified from
being a plaintiff even though she voluntarily paid a higher price for the
goods or services. 7 Rather, all buyers from cartel members are consid-
ered to be victims of the concerted action and are deemed injured
through the payment of supra-competitive prices'" without reference to
violation of the Sherman Act as the creation and promotion of one."); Duplan Corp. v.
Deering Milliken Inc., 594 F.2d 979, 982 (4th Cir. 1979) ("it is no defense that [the
defendants'] actions may have been reluctant or even coerced"), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
1015 (1980); Linseman v. World Hockey Ass'n, 439 F. Supp. 1315, 1321-22 (D. Conn.
1977) ("Court[s] have uniformly rejected any defense that an antitrust violation was
'forced' onto the defendant."); Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co.,
245 F. Supp. 889, 892 (N.D. Ill. 1965) ("economic coercion is not a legal defense to treble
damage actions"). Courts have similarly held that it is no defense to a charge of horizon-
tal price-fixing that coercion was not used on the participants. See American Column &
Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, 412 (1921); United States v. National Ass'n
of Broadcasters, 536 F. Supp. 149, 163-64 (D.D.C. 1982).
14. Given the mutual benefits of a horizontal arrangement, the requirements for a
firm claiming to have withdrawn from a cartel are similarly strict. To prove withdrawal,
the defendant must show "[a]ffirmative acts inconsistent with the object of the conspiracy
and communicated in a manner reasonably calculated to reach co-conspirators." United
States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 464 (1978); see also United States v.
MMR Corp. (LA), 907 F.2d 489, 500 (5th Cir. 1990) (defendant's decision not to submit
bid "hardly inconsistent" with goals of conspiracy), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1388 (1991);
Chiropractic Coop. Ass'n v. American Medical Ass'n, 867 F.2d 270, 274-75 (6th Cir.
1989) (although AMA's activities "could be construed... as withdrawal from the con-
spiracy [the evidence], even if uncontradicted, does not ... firmly establish such a with-
drawal"); United States v. Read, 658 F.2d 1225, 1231 (7th Cir. 1981) (defendant has
burden of proving withdrawal from conspiracy); United States v. Gillen, 599 F.2d 541,
548 (3d Cir.) (burden of proving "affirmative acts inconsistent with the object of the
conspiracy" is on defendant; plaintiff does not have to produce evidence of "continued
overt acts"), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 866 (1979).
15. A non-conspiring rival of the conspirators may well lack standing to challenge the
horizontal cartel. This lack of standing, however, stems from the fact that the rival bene-
fits from the conspiracy and, therefore, lacks antitrust injury. See supra note 9. It has
nothing to do with the presence or absence of coercion on any party.
16. Occasionally an erstwhile co-conspirator will be the victim/plaintiff of a horizon-
tal arrangement, by claiming he would have been better off with competition. See NCAA
v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 95 (1984); P. Areeda & H. Hovenkamp, supra note 9, at
340.2c. As with the buyer/plaintiff, the state of mind of such a conspirator/plaintiff
plays no part in determining the legality of the arrangement, the existence of an agree-
ment, or the standing of the plaintiff.
17. See supra note 7.
18. There is a split among the lower courts concerning whether a buyer from a non-
conspiring rival of the cartel has standing to sue members of the cartel for overcharges
paid to the non-conspirator. Compare Mid-West Paper Prods. Co. v. Continental Group,
Inc., 596 F.2d 573, 587 (3d Cir. 1979) (purchasers from competitors of price-fixers denied
standing to sue for treble damages because "their damage is usually much more specula-
tive and difficult to prove than that of [someone] who is an immediate victim of the
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any individual buyer's actual state of mind.19 Put another way, to the
extent that coercion can be said to be a factor at all in the standing issue
of horizontal restraints, it is assumed to be present whenever a buyer
pays a price above the competitive price.
II. THE ROLE OF COERCION IN THE EARLY VERTICAL PRICE,
TERRITORY, AND CUSTOMER RESTRAINT CASES
(THE LAW BEFORE SYLVANIA)
In contrast to its non-role in the analysis of horizontal restraints, coer-
cion played a key role in the vertical restraint caselaw before Continental
T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc. 20 In particular, coercion came into play
in three significant ways: (1) in the rationale for condemning vertical
price, territory, or customer restraints; (2) in the definition of a vertical
"agreement"; and (3) in the application of the in pari delicto defense.
Without analyzing why, the Supreme Court instinctively recognized in
its early cases"' that coercion was likely to be present where vertical pric-
ing, territory, or customer restraints were at issue. Unlike the partici-
pants in a horizontal cartel who shared a common purpose, the two
primary participants in the vertical arrangement-the manufacturer and
the dealer-were likely, the Court saw, to be antagonistic with regard to
pricing or other restraints.2" The manufacturer seeking to impose such
restraints, the Court noted, "restrict[s] the freedom of trade on the part
of dealers who own what they sell";23 he "constrains" and "forces" the
violation"); In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig.,
497 F. Supp. 218, 227 (C.D. Cal. 1980) (purchasers from non-conspirators may not re-
cover amount of price differential caused by conspiracy) with In re Beef Indus. Antitrust
Litig., 600 F.2d 1148, 1166 n.24 (5th Cir. 1979) (plaintiffs who purchased beef from non-
conspirators at prices affected by conspiracy have sufficient claim of injury under § 4 of
Clayton Act), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 905 (1980); In re Arizona Dairy Prods. Litig., 627 F.
Supp. 233, 236 (D. Ariz. 1985) (purchasers from non-conspirators may recover from
conspirators); In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 552 F. Supp. 518, 523-26 (N.D. IlL. 1982)
(purchasers from non-defendants not barred from possible recovery against defendant-
conspirators). The issue has also generated a fair amount of academic comment. See P.
Areeda & H. Hovenkamp, supra note 9, at 337.3; Blair & Maurer, supra note 9, at 763;
Page, The Scope of Liability, supra note 9, at 1490-92; Note, Standing of Purchasersfrom
Nonconspirators to Challenge Price-Fixing Conspiracy, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 598 (1980); Note,
Monopsonistic Price Fixing and Umbrella Pricing as a Theory of Antitrust Standing: A
New View of Illinois Brick, 50 U. Cin. L. Rev. 52 (1981). The resolution of this issue,
however, does not turn on the presence or absence of coercion.
19. The purchaser who is forced to pay more for a product because of a horizontal
boycott similarly has standing even though, in some sense, the purchaser voluntarily paid
the higher price. See, eg., FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411,
421-25 (1990) (boycott was illegal even though government buyer agreed to higher price).
20. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
21. See infra notes 23-29.
22. A vertical arrangement can be between a manufacturer and a dealer, a manufac-
turer and a wholesaler, or a wholesaler and a retailer. For ease of reference, vertical
arrangements in this article will be referred to as being between a manufacturer and his
dealer.
23. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 407-08 (1911).
In the early cases, resale prices were regarded by the Court as a matter of concern pri-
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dealer to maintain a suggested price or to sell in a specified territory or to
specified customers.24
Moreover, although the Court saw that there could be horizontal im-
plications in the imposition of vertical restraints,2" the Court quickly
seized upon the vertical effect-coercion of the dealer and consequent
loss of dealer freedom-as an independent reason for condemning verti-
cal restraints.26 In Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co. ,27
marily for the dealer, not for the manufacturer. "[T]he advantage of established retail
prices primarily concerns the dealers. The enlarged profits which would result from ad-
herence to the established rates would go to them and not to the [manufacturer]." Id. at
407. To the extent the manufacturer was concerned about resale prices, the Court consid-
ered that concern to be outweighed by society's interest in preserving the dealer's freedom
to trade. See id. at 407-08. Later in Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968), the
Court acknowledged that "a substantial number of manufacturers formulate and enforce
complicated plans to maintain resale prices because they deem them advantageous [and
that] it is not difficult to conceive of situations in which manufacturers would rightly
regard minimum resale price maintenance to be in their interest." Id. at 151 n.7.
24. The language of "forcing," "coercion," and "constraining" runs throughout the
Supreme Court decisions before Sylvania. See, e.g., Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145,
152 (1968) (vertical restraints " 'cripple the freedom of traders and thereby restrain their
ability to sell in accordance with their own judgments'" (quoting Kiefer & Stewart Co. v.
Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211, 213 (1951)); Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13, 21
(1964) ("By reason of the lease and 'consignment' agreement, [the] dealers are coercively
laced into an arrangement" under which the defendant imposes the resale price.); FTC v.
Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441, 454 (1922) ("In its practical operation [the defend-
ant's system] necessarily constrains the trader ... to maintain the prices 'suggested' by
[the defendant].").
25. In Dr. Miles, the Court analogized the manufacturer's vertical price setting to a
horizontal dealer cartel. See Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 398-400. Because both eliminated
competition among dealers, the Court concluded that the vertical restraint was illegal:
[Dr. Miles] can fare no better with its plan of identical contracts than could the
dealers themselves if they formed a combination and endeavored to establish
the same restrictions, and thus to achieve the same result, by agreement with
each other .... But agreements or combinations between dealers, having for
their sole purpose the destruction of competition and the fixing of prices, are
injurious to the public interest and void .... [Dr. Mile's] plan falls within the
principle which condemns contracts of this class. It, in effect, creates a combi-
nation for the prohibited purposes.
Id. at 408 (citations omitted). Later in White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253
(1963), the Court backed off its assumption that vertical restraints always had the same
effect as horizontal restraints. See White Motor, 372 U.S. at 263. At least with respect to
vertical territorial restraints, the Court concluded that it did not "know enough of the
economic and business stuff" regarding the vertical restraints to be certain they had the
same "purpose or effect" as horizontal restraints. See id.
Commentators have argued that the Court was flatly wrong in Dr. Miles in assuming
that all vertical restraints have the same anti-competitive effects as dealer cartels. In
particular, they argue that manufacturer-imposed vertical restraints, unlike vertical re-
straints resulting from a dealer cartel, may have pro-competitive effects in the interbrand
market. See infra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
26. See, e.g., Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 153 (1968) ("[T]he combination
... to force [the plaintiff/dealer] to maintain a specified price for [the] resale... consti-
tuted, without more, an illegal restraint of trade under § 1 of the Sherman Act."); Simp.
son, 377 U.S. at 17 ("a supplier may not use coercion on its retail outlets to achieve resale
price maintenance"); United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707, 721
(1944) ("[A distributor] sells to its wholesalers at prices satisfactory to itself. Beyond that
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the first vertical restraint case to reach it, the Court began its analysis
with the premise that
[t]he public have an interest in every person's carrying on his trade
freely: so has the individual. All interference with individual liberty of
action in trading .... if there is nothing more, [is] contrary to public
policy, and therefore void.28
A few years later the Court reiterated:
The purpose of the Sherman Act is to prohibit monopolies, contracts
and combinations which probably would unduly interfere with the free
exercise of their rights by those engaged.., in trade and commerce-
in a word to preserve the right of freedom to trade.29
The notion of trader freedom, and the concurrent emphasis on coer-
cion, also played an important role in the definition of an "agreement" in
the vertical context. Because section 1 of the Sherman Act only con-
demns concerted action,3" the Court needed to find an agreement be-
point it may not project its power over the prices of its wholesale customers by agree-
ment.").
Justice Harlan in his dissent in Albrecht objected to the majority's use of trader free-
dom as a basis for imposing per se liability under the Sherman Act.
It has long been recognized that one of the objectives of the Sherman Act was to
preserve, for social rather than economic reasons, a high degree of indepen-
dence, multiplicity, and variety in the economic system. Recognition of this
objective does not, however, require this Court to hold that every commercial
act that fetters the freedom of some trader is a proper subject for a per se rule in
the sense that it has no adequate provable justification.
Albrecht, 390 U.S. at 158 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan contended that the
primary purpose of the antitrust laws was to prohibit the "much more significant evil of
lessened competition" that comes from horizontal cartels rather than to protect trader
freedom. Id. at 159 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
27. 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
28. Id. at 406 (quoting Nordenfelt v. Maxim Nordenfelt Guns & Ammunition Co.,
1904 A.C. 565). The Supreme Court recognized that this statement of the law was a
general rule subject to exceptions. "[R]estraints of trade and interference with individual
liberty of action may be justified by the special circumstances of a particular case." Id. at
406-07. In Dr. Miles, however, the Court rejected the manufacturer's proffered justifica-
tion of "the importance of a standard retail price and . . .[a general allegation] that
confusion and damage have resulted from sales at less than the prices fixed." Id. at 407.
29. United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919). According to the
Court, trader freedom actually had a two-fold importance--it preserved the dealers' "in-
dependent discretion," and it protected the "free and natural flow" of the competitive
market. See United States v. A. Schrader's Son, Inc., 252 U.S. 85, 99-100 (1920); see also
Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 152 (1968) (scheme to fix maximum prices "sub-
stitut[es] the perhaps erroneous judgment of a seller for the forces of the competitive
market").
30. Section one of the Sherman Act states in relevant part: "Every contract, combina-
tion in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal." 15
U.S.C. § 1 (1988). While the Sherman Act uses the three terms "contract," "combina-
tion," and "conspiracy," it is generally recognized that there is no meaningful distinction
among them. See VI P. Areeda, supra note 7, at 1403; 2 J. Von Kalinowski, Antitrust
Laws and Trade Regulation § 6.01[1] (1991); Note, Alliterative Illegalities in Antitrust
Law: Contract Combination and Conspiracy, 15 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 239, 239 (1985). For
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tween the manufacturer imposing the vertical restraints and some other
party in order to subject the vertical restraint to antitrust scrutiny.3' The
Court solved this problem by holding, in its early vertical cases, that the
dealer could be the "other party" to a vertical agreement,32 even when
the dealer had been coerced into complying with the vertical restraint.33
Thus, unlike the horizontal agreement, which involved a common plan
that benefitted all participants, the agreement in the vertical context
could and often did exist where the plan had, in essence, been crammed
down the throat of one party to the arrangement.34
Not only was coercion not a barrier to the formation of a vertical
agreement, it also became a pivotal factor in showing that a vertical
agreement actually existed. In its famous United States v. Colgate &
Co. 35 opinion, the Supreme Court held that where a manufacturer simply
ease of reference, the term "agreement" will be used in this article to refer to the contract-
combination-conspiracy element of the § 1 offense.
31. Absent an agreement, the manufacturer's imposition of pricing, territorial, or cus-
tomers restraints on his dealer would be wholly legal. See United States v. Colgate & Co.,
250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919).
32. In its first vertical restraint case, Dr. Miles, the Court found the agreement ele-
ment satisfied where the manufacturer entered into an express agreement with his whole-
salers and retailers regarding resale prices. The Court in Dr. Miles did not consider
whether, given the inherent two-party nature of any vertical arrangement, some explicit
agreements might fall outside the ambit of § 1. See Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D.
Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 411 (1911).
33. See, e.g., FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441, 454 (1922) (agreement
between manufacturer and dealer found where manufacturer's marketing system "con-
strains" dealer); United States v. A. Schrader's Son, Inc., 252 U.S. 85, 99-100 (1920)
("parties are combined through agreements designed to take away dealers' control of
their own affairs and thereby destroy competition and restrain.., trade"); see also Al-
brecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 150 n.6 (1968) (dealer "could have claimed a combi-
nation between respondent and himself, at least as of the day he unwillingly complied
with respondent's advertised price"); Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13, 21 (1964)
(agreement between oil company and dealer found in coercive consignment and lease
contracts). There could, of course, also be an agreement between a manufacturer and a
willing (or, at least, noncomplaining) dealer. See, e.g., Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D.
Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 394 (1911) (specific contracts between manufacturer and
dealers fixing resale prices with no showing of any actual coercion). In its famous foot-
note six in Albrecht the Court noted: "[The plaintiff-carrier] might successfully have
claimed that [the defendant-publisher] had combined with other carriers because the
firmly enforced price policy applied to all carriers, most of whom acquiesced in it." Al-
brecht, 390 U.S. at 150 n.6.
34. In Albrecht, the Court acknowledged that it was embracing a concept of a vertical
agreement that involved coercion of one party to the agreement. The Court specifically
rejected the "notion that there can be no agreement violative of § 1 unless that agreement
accrues to the benefit of both parties." Albrecht, 390 U.S. at 152 n.8. Justice Harlan, ill
his dissenting opinion, argued that, by permitting an agreement to be found where one
party to that agreement was coerced, the Court was, in reality, nullifying the agreement
requirement of § 1 and saying "it is unlawful for one person to dictate [prices] to another;
any pressure brought to bear in support of such dictation renders the dictator liable to
any dictatee who is damaged." Id. at 162 (Harlan, J., dissenting). In contrast to the
majority, Justice Harlan would not permit a finding of an agreement unless the dealer,
like the manufacturer, was "economically interested" in the resale prices set. See id. at
163 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
35. 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
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announced resale prices and refused to sell to those dealers who did not
abide by the announced prices, the manufacturer was simply exercising
his freedom to select his customers, and there was no "agreement" with
the dealer36 who unilaterally chose to comply with the manufacturer's
wishes.37 However, as later cases showed, if the manufacturer went be-
yond the simple Colgate scenario, an "agreement" could be found.3" Co-
ercion, in particular, was among the types of "further actions" that
would take a manufacturer out of the Colgate safe harbor.39 If the manu-
facturer, in negotiating with the dealer, used coercion to secure the
dealer's acquiescence in the pricing (or territorial or customer) limita-
tions, the arrangement fell outside the simple-and legal--Colgate cate-
36. See id. at 307. In Colgate, the Court's concern was principally with the manufac-
turer's freedom to deal with whomever he wished. The Court noted that the Sherman
Act "does not restrict the long recognized right of trader or manufacturer engaged in an
entirely private business, freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to parties
with whom he will deal." Id.; see also United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321
U.S. 707, 722 (1944) (business has "right to select its customers").
37. The Court in Colgate quoted the district court's observation:
No suggestion is made that the... manufacturer attempted to reserve or retain
any interest in the goods sold, or to restrain the vendee in his right to barter and
sell the same without restriction. The retailer, after buying, could, if he chose,
give away his purchase... or not sell it at all ....
Colgate, 250 U.S. at 305.
38. In United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960), the Court stated:
[Ain unlawful combination is not just such as arises from a price maintenance
agreement, express or implied; such a combination is also organized if the pro-
ducer secures adherence to his suggested prices by means which go beyond his
mere declination to sell to a customer who will not observe his announced
policy.
ld. at 43. When the manufacturer went beyond Colgate, the dealer's "acquiescence is not
... a matter of individual free choice prompted alone by the desirability of the product."
Id. at 47. For a detailed discussion of the vertical restraint cases from Dr. Miles to Parke.
Davis, see Levi, The Parke, Davis-Colgate Doctrine: The Ban on Resale Price Mainte-
nance, 1960 Sup. Ct. Rev. 258.
39. Commentators have been virtually unanimous in denouncing the distinction
drawn in Colgate and its progeny between unilateral and concerted action. See, eg.,
Baker, Interconnected Problems of Doctrine and Economics In the Section One Labyrinth:
Is Sylvania A Way Out?, 67 Va. L. Rev. 1457, 1474 (1981) ("only a particularly artificial
and restricted notion of concerted action could explain the distinction between Colgate
and Dr. Miles"); Burns, Rethinking the "Agreement" Element in Vertical Antitrust Re-
straints, 51 Ohio St. L.J. 1, 18-19 (1990) ("Obviously, the distinction drawn by Colgate
and its progeny between legal and illegal vertical arrangements was based on a highly
strained and artificial interpretation of an agreement."); Piraino, The Case for Presuming
the Legality of Quality Motivated Restrictions on Distribution, 63 Notre Dame L Rev. 1,
10-11 (1988) ("The distinctions set forth in cases between unilateral and concerted con-
duct is simply illogical."); Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act:
Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 655, 686-87 (1962) ("a
distinction between a program of resale price maintenance effected by contracts and
'agreements,' and one effected by threats of refusal to deal, is wholly untenable as a prac-
tical or logical matter").
Indeed, the Supreme Court itself acknowledged that the effect on the market was the
same in the simple Colgate situation (which was deemed to be unilateral and therefore
legal action) and the case in which a manufacturer took some additional steps (which was
deemed to be concerted and therefore illegal action). See Parke, Davis, 362 U.S. at 44.
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gory and was subject to antitrust attack.4"
The third area in which coercion played a significant role in the early
vertical restraint cases was in the in pari delicto defense.4" This common
law defense became relevant in the vertical context 42 precisely because
40. See, e.g., Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 142
(1968) ("each [franchise dealer] can clearly charge a combination between [the
franchisor] and himself, as of the day he unwillingly complied with the restrictive
franchise agreements ... or between [the franchisor] and other franchise dealers, whose
acquiescence in [the franchisor's] firmly enforced restraints was induced by 'the commu-
nicated danger of termination'" (citations omitted)); Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S.
145, 150 n.6 (1968) ("Under Parke, Davis [the plaintiff/dealer] could have claimed a
combination between [Herald Co.] and himself, at least as of the day he unwillingly com-
plied with [Herald's] advertised price."); United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388
U.S. 365, 372 (1967) (agreement held to exist where Schwinn had been "firm and reso-
lute" in insisting on vertical restraints and Schwinn's" 'firmness'. . . was grounded upon
the communicated danger of termination"); Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13, 24
(1964) (oil company liable under § 1 where there was "an agreement for resale price
maintenance, coercively employed"). Indeed, in Parke, Davis, Justice Harlan argued in
his dissenting opinion that no agreement had been formed where the dealers' "acquies-
cence was not brought about by 'coercion' or 'agreement.'" Parke, Davis, 362 U.S. at 55
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
Similarly in lower court opinions, coercion came to be "a substitute for express agree-
ment. Indeed, many lower courts came routinely to hold that unwilling compliance with
another's demands in order to avoid termination creates an agreement." VII P. Areeda,
supra note 7, 1451a, at 120; see, e.g., Yentsch v. Texaco, 630 F.2d 46, 53 (2d Cir. 1980)
("While evidence of exposition, persuasion, argument, or pressure is alone insufficient to
establish coercion.., threats of termination, as long as they secure adherence to the fixed
price,... trigger[] a finding of an illegal combination."); Reed Bros., Inc. v. Monsanto
Co., 525 F.2d 486, 495-96 (8th Cir. 1975) (evidence that "termination awaited the miscre-
ant distributor who refused to adhere" supports finding of illegal combination). As a
result of relying on coercion as a basis for finding an agreement, courts found it necessary
to distinguish between coercion, on the one hand, and "exposition, persuasion and argu-
ment," on the other. The latter, the courts held, were not sufficient to give rise to a
finding of agreement. See, e.g., Yentsch, 630 F.2d at 53 ("evidence of exposition, persua-
sion, argument, or pressure is alone insufficient to establish coercion"); Arnott v. Ameri-
can Oil Co., 609 F.2d 873, 884-85 (8th Cir. 1979) (implying that testimony that
defendant's calls were "mere suggestions" would, without more, bar finding of coercion),
cert. denied, 446 U.S. 918 (1980); Gray v. Shell Oil Co., 469 F.2d 742, 747-48 (9th Cir.
1972) ("distinction between 'coercion' on the one hand and 'exposition, persuasion and
argument' on the other,... is firmly embedded in the decisional law on vertical price-
fixing"), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 943 (1973); see also VII P. Areeda, supra note 7, at 1440
(noting that persuasion/agreement distinction served function of letting manufacturer
make helpful marketing suggestions to dealer).
41. In pari delicto means "of equal fault." The defense "is grounded on two premises:
first, that courts should not lend their good offices to mediating disputes among wrongdo-
ers; and second, that denying judicial relief to an admitted wrongdoer is an effective
means of deterring illegality." Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S.
299, 306 (1985). For a discussion of the common law origins of the in pari delicto de-
fense, see Handler & Sacks, The Continued Vitality of In Pari Delicto As An Antitrust
Defense, 70 Geo. L.J. 1123, 1128-31 (1982).
42. The in pari delicto defense is occasionally asserted in a horizontal case where an
erstwhile member of the cartel later seeks to sue the cartel. See, e.g., General Leaseways,
Inc. v. National Truck Leasing Ass'n, 830 F.2d 716, 720-24 (7th Cir. 1987) (association
member could be barred from challenging location restrictions of association because
plaintiff bears "substantially equal responsibility for the anti-competitive restrictions" as
defendant); Southwest Marine, Inc. v. Campbell Indus., 732 F.2d. 744, 746 (9th Cir.)
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one party was permitted to fill simultaneously the dual roles of co-con-
spirator and plaintiff/victim.43 The in pari delicto defense posed the
question: Is there a point at which the conspiring dealer was so actively
involved in the vertical restraint that she should be wholly barred from
suing as a plaintiff/victim? In Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International
Parts Corp.," the Supreme Court indicated that the answer depended in
part on whether the dealer had been coerced into accepting the restraints
in question. Where the dealer did not voluntarily support the scheme but
instead had the restraints "thrust" upon her,45 the in pari delicto defense
did not bar her suit.' Such a dealer, the Court noted, "may be subject to
(judgment for plaintiff on in pari delicto issue because plaintiff was not substantially in-
volved in formation of illegal cartel), cert denied, 469 U.S. 1072 (1984); Board of Regents
v. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. 1276, 1324-26 (W.D. Okla. 1982) (member schools not barred by
in pari delicto defense from suing NCAA because schools were not active in creation of
questioned restraints and only complied with restraints because of threats from NCAA),
aff'd in part, 707 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1983), aff'd, 468 U.S. 85 (1984). This defense has
even been asserted (unsuccessfully) against a buyer from an alleged horizontal cartel. See
Burlington Indus. v. Milliken & Co., 690 F.2d 380, 387 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461
U.S. 914 (1983).
43. It is possible for a consumer to be the plaintiff in a vertical case and sue the
manufacturer and the complying (whether coerced or willing) dealer for violating the
antitrust laws through their agreement. See P. Areeda & H. Hovenkamp, supra note 9, at
337.2e, 340.3a. The much more typical private vertical restraint case, however, in-
volves a dealer/plaintiff who alleges that either she agreed with the manufacturer or her
fellow dealers agreed with the manufacturer. See Salop & White, Economic Analysis of
Private Antitrust Litigation, 74 Geo. L.J. 1001, 1005 (1986) (empirical study showed that
dealers are the main parties who allege vertical price fixing). In Albrecht, the Supreme
Court stated in dicta that either of these two dealer-manufacturer agreements would sat-
isfy the conspiracy element of the vertical restraint case. See Albrecht, 390 U.S. at 150
n.6. The prevalence of dealer-plaintiffs is likely due, in large part, to the fact that dealers
are a more knowledgeable and reliable class of antitrust plaintiffs than consumers in the
vertical restraint area. See McArthur & Paterson, The Effects of Monsanto, Matsushita,
and Sharp on the Plaintiff's Incentive to Sue, 23 Conn. L. Rev. 333, 344 (1991).
44. 392 U.S. 134 (1968). In Perma Life, the defendant franchisor argued that, given
the franchise dealers' "enthusiastic" desire to acquire a Midas franchise and their "full
knowledge" of all aspects of the contract, the dealers were wholly barred by the in pari
delicto doctrine from bringing an antitrust suit based on restraints in the franchise agree-
ment. See id. at 138.
45. See id. at 141. The Court noted that the dealers' participation in the restraints
was "not voluntary in any meaningful sense. They sought the franchises enthusiastically
but they did not actively seek each and every clause of the agreement. Rather, many of
the clauses were quite clearly detrimental to their interests, and they alleged that they had
continually objected to them." Id at 139. Justice White, in his concurring opinion,
echoed this point:
These cases are enough to warrant reversal in this case, once it is concluded that
the illegal arrangement ... was thrust on [the dealers by Midas]... When
those with market power and leverage persuade, coerce, or influence others to
cooperate in an illegal combination to their damage, allowing recovery to the
latter is wholly consistent with the purpose [of the antitrust laws].
Id. at 143-45 (White, J., concurring).
46. The Court left open the question of whether a "'truly complete involvement and
participation in a monopolistic scheme could ever be a basis ... for barring a plaintiff's
cause of action." Id. at 140. Justice White stated in his concurring opinion that he
"would deny recovery where plaintiff and defendant bear substantially equal responsibil-
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some criticism for having taken . . . part in [the] allegedly illegal
scheme," but her "participation was not voluntary in any meaningful
sense."47 The upshot of the Perma Life decision was that, once again,
the dealer's state of mind was relevant-this time as a type of standing
device to filter out some would-be plaintiffs.4" By limiting plaintiff status
to coerced dealers, the Court permitted private vertical lawsuits to be
maintained49 but avoided giving treble damages to an "undeserving"
ity" for the injury. Id. at 146 (White, J., concurring). Justice Fortas felt that if the dealer
"originated and insisted upon" the restraints, he should not recover damages. Id. at 148
(Fortas, J., concurring) (emphasis omitted). Justice Marshall refined and combined the
thoughts of Justices White and Fortas, by stating that he would bar a dealer's recovery
where the dealer "actively participated in the formation and implementation of an illegal
scheme, and is substantially equally at fault." Id. at 149 (Marshall, J., concurring).
Later, in a securities law case, the Supreme Court stated that an in par! delicto defense is
available where (1) the plaintiff bears at least substantially equal responsibility for the
violation and (2) preclusion of the suit will not significantly interfere with the effective
enforcement of the laws. See Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S.
299, 310-11 (1985).
47. Perma Life, 392 U.S. at 139. The Court also noted that "permitting the plaintiff
to recover a windfall gain does not encourage continued violations by [dealers] since they
remain fully subject to civil and criminal penalties for their own illegal conduct." Id.
The potential civil liability would presumably be in a lawsuit initiated by a consumer who
bought from a dealer that had acquiesced in the vertical restraints. See supra note 43.
48. As a standing device, in pari delicto works much like the Court's rules limiting
antitrust plaintiffs to those directly injured. See, e.g., Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431
U.S. 720, 729 (1977) ("overcharged direct purchaser, and not others in chain of manufac-
ture or distribution, is the party injured"). Each of these doctrines eliminates as plaintiffs
persons who have actually been injured by the antitrust violation because of a competing
policy reason (in the case of Illinois Brick, the desirability of avoiding duplicative recov-
eries and complex damage calculations, see id. at 730-33; in the case of in pari delicto, the
desirability of not rewarding a wrongdoer).
After Perma Life, the lower courts, when confronted with the in pari delicto defense in
a vertical context, have considered such factors as whether the dealer actively partici-
pated in creating the restraint and whether the dealer was coerced or pressured. See, e.g.,
Midwestern Waffles, Inc. v. Waffle House, Inc., 734 F.2d 705, 715 (1 1th Cir. 1984) (in
pari delicto defense rejected where dealer acquiesced in defendant's division of territories
but there was "no evidence.., of plaintiffs' truly complete involvement and participation
in allegedly illegal arrangement"); Javelin Corp. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 546 F.2d 276, 279 (9th
Cir. 1976) ("plaintiff is barred from recovery only when the illegal conspiracy could not
have been formed but for the plaintiff's participation"), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 938 (1977);
Greene v. General Foods Corp., 517 F.2d 635, 646 (5th Cir. 1975) (considering whether
injured party was willing participant in restraint against trade), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 942
(1976); Sahm v. V-1 Oil Co., 402 F.2d 69, 72 (10th Cir. 1968) (defense of in pari delicto
insufficient to defeat plaintiff's claim where plaintiff coerced into agreeing to resale price
maintenance scheme). For a discussion of the lower court cases, see Handler & Sacks,
supra note 41, at 1140-48.
49. Throughout its opinion in Perma Life, the Court reiterated its concern for retain-
ing an effective private right of action in antitrust. The Court noted that "the purposes of
the antitrust laws are best served by insuring that the private action will be an ever-
present threat" and that even where that plaintiff is "no less morally reprehensible than
the defendant ... the law encourages his suit to further the overriding public policy in
favor of competition." Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S.
134, 139 (1968). A contrary result would "threaten the effectiveness of the private action
as a vital means for enforcing ... antitrust policy." Id. at 136.
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dealer.5 o
Thus, in contrast to its treatment of cases involving horizontal cartels,
the Supreme Court quickly made the state of mind of one participant to
the arrangement (usually the dealer) a key consideration when dealing
with vertical restraints. The dealer's state of mind qua victim was central
to the rationale for applying the antitrust laws; the dealer's state of mind
qua co-conspirator became significant in determining whether an agree-
ment existed.51 Then, having thrust one party into the dual roles of
plaintiff and co-conspirator, the Court used coercion as one factor in de-
termining whether a particular plaintiff/co-conspirator should be permit-
ted to sue.
III. THE ROLE OF COERCION IN THE CURRENT LAW ONVERTICAL
PRICE, TERRITORY, AND CUSTOMER RESTRAINT
Beginning in the 1950s, there emerged what has been called the eco-
nomic efficiency approach to antitrust analysis.52 Adherents of this ap-
proach argue that the sole (or at least primary) goal of the antitrust laws
should be economic efficiency-insuring that markets remain non-
cartelized so that goods and services are offered to consumers at competi-
tive prices and output expands to meet consumer demand. 53 These com-
50. See Austin, The Individual Coercion Doctrine in Tie-In Analysi" Confusing and
Irrelevant, 65 Calif. L. Rev. 1143, 1152 (1977) (discussing use of coercion or fault as
similar filter in tying cases). The use of fault as a standing filter in vertical restraint cases
has been criticized by William Page. See Page, Antitrust Damages and Economic Effi-
ciency: An Approach to Antitrust Injury, 47 U. Chi. L. Rev. 467, 501 (1980) [hereinafter
Page, Antitrust Damages].
51. Both such uses of coercion are in sharp contrast to the horizontal-restraint
caselaw where coercion played no part in the analysis. See supra Part I.
52. At the forefront of the economic efficiency approach was the Chicago School of
antitrust analysis. For a brief summary of the key aspects of this approach, see Posner,
The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 925 (1979) [hereinafter
Posner, The Chicago School]. For one of the earliest statements of the economic effi-
ciency approach to vertical restraints, see Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair
Trade?, 3 J.L. & Econ. 86 (1960). In recent years, a number of commentators have
adopted largely economic approaches to antitrust but have nonetheless staked out posi-
tions somewhat different from the Chicagoans. See, e.g., Brodley, The Economic Goals of
Antitrust Efficiency, Consumer Welfare, and Technological Progress, 62 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
1020, 1041-42 (1987) (discussing the sometimes conflicting policy implications of eco-
nomic efficiency goal and consumer welfare goal); Hovenkamp, Antitrust's Protected
Classes, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 40-41 (1989) (suggesting that even if economic efficiency is
only goal of antitrust policy, model developed by Chicago School is unduly narrow in
analysis); Markovits, The Limits to Simplifying Antitrust. A Reply To Professor Easter-
brook, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 41, 49 (1984) (discussing role of consumer welfare in antitrust
policy). No attempt will be made in this article to parse out the exact boundaries of each
of these sub-theories. The economic approach presented here is, by and large, one
ascribed to all commentators advocating an economically-based antitrust analysis.
53. See R. Bork, supra note 2, at 20-21; R. Posner, Antitrust Law, supra note 2. at 8-
18; Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements and the Rule of Reason, 53 Antitrust LJ. 135,
138-40 (1984) [hereinafter Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements]; Easterbrook, Is There a
Ratchet in Antitrust Law?, 60 Tex. L. Rev. 705, 715-16 (1982) [hereinafter Easterbrook,
Is There A Ratchet]. The critics of the economic efficiency model argue that the model
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mentators thus shift the emphasis of the antitrust laws away from
concern for particular dealers or business rivals to concern for consumers
and the market as a whole.54 According to these commentators, the
chief impediment to the competitive (economically efficient) market is
the interbrand horizontal cartel, which allows would-be competitors to
join market power and, like a monopolist, restrict output and reap supra-
competitive profits." The prevention of such horizontal activity is what
the antitrust laws should seek.56 These commentators argue that purely
"social" concerns, such as a desire to preserve a dealer's "trader free-
dom" or a desire to protect small businesses are amorphous and have no
economic significance." Under this analysis, vertical restraints can be
good or bad-economically efficient or inefficient-depending upon their
fails to take into account the other goals that the antitrust laws were intended to foster,
such as trader freedom, the protection of small businesses, and the dispersion of power
among many merchants. See, e.g., Flynn, The "Is" and "Ought" of Vertical Restraints
After Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 71 Cornell L. Rev. 1095, 1137-39 (1986)
(rejecting "neoclassical" concept of efficiency as sole goal of antitrust policy); Fox, supra
note 2, at 1146-54, 1182 (arguing that values other than efficiency should demand equal
attention in guiding antitrust policy, and that historical goals of power dispersion and
economic opportunity continue to be respected); Piraino, Sharp Dealing: The Horizon-
tal/Vertical Dichotomy in Distributor Termination Cases, 38 Emory L.J. 311, 336 (1989)
(arguing that "the primary reasons for continuation of the per se rule appear not to be
economic, but social and political") [hereinafter Piraino, Sharp Dealing].
54. This concern for the market as a whole is often termed as "protection of competi-
tion, not competitors." Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962). Crit-
ics of the economic efficiency approach often object that unless competitors are protected,
there will be no competition. See USA Petroleum Co. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 859 F.2d
687, 696 (9th Cir. 1988), rev'd, 110 S. Ct. 1884 (1990); Flynn & Ponsoldt, Legal Reason-
ing and the Jurisprudence of Vertical Restraints: The Limitations of Neoclassical Eco-
nomic Analysis in the Resolution of Antitrust Disputes, 62 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1125, 1126 n.4
(1987). This objection misses the mark to some extent. The economic efficiency advo-
cates are concerned with maintaining competitive markets and therefore would not per-
mit horizontal cartels. What they are not concerned with is protecting specific members
of a market. In particular, provided there are low entry barriers into the market, they are
unconcerned about the loss of inefficient competitors. See Easterbrook, Predatory Strate-
gies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. Chi. L. Rev. 263, 297-304 (1981); Page, The Scope of
Liability, supra note 9, at 1451-52, 1469-70.
55. See R. Bork, supra note 2, at 90-106; R. Posner, Antitrust Law, supra note 2, at 8-
18; Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements, supra note 53, at 140.
56. Most economic efficiency advocates would apply the antitrust laws beyond hori-
zontal cartels. In particular, they would apply them to certain tying arrangements, to
some exclusionary practices by monopolists, and to some mergers. See R. Posner, Anti-
trust Law, supra note 2, at 40-55, 96-97, 182-84, 188-89; Hovenkamp, Merger Actions For
Damages, 35 Hastings L.J. 937, 940-42 (1984) [hereinafter Hovenkamp, Merger Actions);
Page, Optimal Antitrust Penalties and Competitors' Injury, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 2151, 2163-
65 (1990) [hereinafter Page, Optimal Antitrust Penalties]. The common denominator in
all these applications is that the antitrust laws would be used primarily where the conduct
in question was likely to result in higher prices and restricted output in a market.
57. Richard Posner and Frank Easterbrook argue that even if Congress wanted to
protect small businesses or trader freedom, the antitrust laws are ill-suited for furthering
these goals. See R. Posner, Antitrust Law, supra note 2, at 19; Easterbrook, Is There A
Ratchet, supra note 53, at 715-16; Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, 84 Mich. L.
Rev. 1696, 1703-05 (1986); see also VIII P. Areeda, Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Anti-
trust Principles and Their Application T 1609 (1989) (discussing weakness of dealer au-
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horizontal interbrand effects.58
According to economic theory, most vertical restraints are used by
manufacturers as means of increasing interbrand competition and are,
therefore, economically efficient and should be encouraged as pro-com-
petitive. 9 The typical manufacturer imposes such restraints not to price-
gouge the public or to provide his dealer with supra-competitive profits
at the expense of the consumers.' Instead, the manufacturer is seeking
to force his dealer to provide various services to the consumer.6' By do-
tonomy argument); R. Bork, supra note 2, at 54-56 (rejecting theory that attributes social
and political purposes to antitrust legislation).
58. See H. Hovenkamp, Economics, supra note 4, at § 9.2; R. Posner, Antitrust Law,
supra note 2, at 147-5 1; Baxter, The Viability of Vertical Restraints Doctrine, 75 Calif. L
Rev. 933, 936-46 (1987).
Adherents to the economic efficiency approach argue that price and non-price vertical
restraints function in the same way and should be treated the same under the antitrust
laws. See H. Hovenkamp, Economics, supra note 4, § 9.3, at 261-62; R. Posner, Anti-
trust Law, supra note 2, at 160; see also Liebeler, supra note 4, at 46-47 (arguing that
many non-price restriction are used to maintain or stabilize price and all such restrictions
would be judged under rule of reason). Even some commentators who are critical of
some aspects of the economic efficiency approach argue that the price/non-price dichot-
omy is senseless. See Piraino, supra note 39, at 15, 26; Piraino, Sharp Dealing, supra note
53, at 334-36.
59. See Baxter, supra note 58, at 945-46; Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements, supra
note 53, at 146-49; Hay, Vertical Restraints After Monsanto, 70 Cornell L. Rev. 418, 437
(1985); Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution: Per
Se Legality, 48 U. Chi. L. Rev. 6, 22-23 (1981) [hereinafter Posner, The Next Step]; see
also H. Hovenkamp, Economics, supra note 4, § 9.2, at 252-54 (describing use of vertical
restraints to increase interbrand sales).
60. Unless the manufacturer is a monopolist, any attempt to use vertical restraints for
price gouging the public will fail for the simple reason that consumers will switch to
different brands. For a similar reason, it is not in the manufacturer's best interest to use
vertical restraints to give his dealers supra-competitive profits. From the manufacturer's
perspective, the dealer's profits are in essence a cost of distribution that increases the
overall cost of the manufacturer's product. Since a higher price to the consumer will
result in lower sales volumes, the manufacturer will want to limit his dealer to making
merely a competitive rate of return. See VIII P. Areeda, supra note 57, at " 1622; R.
Posner, Antitrust Law, supra note 2, at 147; Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements, supra
note 53, at 146-47; see also Monahan's Marine, Inc. v. Boston Whaler, Inc., 866 F.2d
525, 528 (1st Cir. 1989) ("profit-maximizing dealer monopolist would set retail prices
that, from the supplier's perspective, are too high and unduly restrict the product's
sales").
61. According to economic theory, when the manufacturer fixes a resale price that
exceeds costs, or assigns exclusive territories, the dealers will compete among themselves
by providing services to the consumer (who, faced with a uniform price for the manufac-
turer's product, will go to the dealer providing the greatest services). See R. Posner,
Antitrust Law, supra note 2, at 148. The dealer will continue providing services until her
marginal cost of distribution meets the resale price, at which point she "will not be receiv-
ing any monopoly profits but will be furnishing services at the level desired by the manu-
facturer." Id.; see Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements, supra note 53, at 147-48; cf.
Hovenkamp, Vertical Restrictions and Monopoly Power, 64 B.U.L. Rev. 521, 524 (1984)
(dealers subject to vertical price restraints "will compete in the amount of point-of-sale
services they provide, and the competition will drive up the level of those services until
the marginal cost to the dealer of selling [the product], including a reasonable profit,
equals the maintained resale price") [hereinafter Hovenkamp, Vertical Restrictions].
Under the economic efficiency theory, the manufacturer cannot simply lower his
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ing so, the manufacturer can offer the consumer a package of product
plus service 6Z-a package that the manufacturer believes consumers want
and that will be more competitive on the interbrand market than product
alone.63 Admittedly, the typical vertical restraint will deprive the dealer
wholesale price to his dealers and hope they will provide the desired services. Even if
some dealers do provide the services, other dealers will "free ride"-they will charge a
lower retail price to the consumer and "ride" on the services provided by other dealers.
Eventually the full service (and higher priced) dealers will go out of business to the detri-
ment of both the manufacturer (who loses distribution) and the consumer (who loses
services). To avoid the free-rider problem, the manufacturer will impose the vertical re-
straints on all his dealers. See H. Hovenkamp, Economics, supra note 4, § 9.2, at 252; R.
Posner, Antitrust Law, supra note 2, at 149; Calvani & Berg, Resale Price Maintenance
After Monsanto: A Doctrine Still At War With Itself, 1984 Duke L.J. 1163, 1181-82;
Kelly, The Role of the Free Rider In Resale Price Maintenance: The Loch Ness Monster
of Antitrust Captured, 10 Geo. Mason U.L. Rev. 327, 338-39 (1988); Telser, supra note
52, at 91-92.
Some critics of the economic efficiency approach dispute the validity of the free rider
theory and argue that the manufacturer could achieve the same result without resale
price maintenance by simply requiring his dealers to provide specified services. See, e.g.,
L. Sullivan, Handbook of the Law of Antitrust 386 (1977) (by requiring that all dealers
provide specific services, manufacturer prevents any dealer from selling for less than de-
sired price); Flynn, Which Past Is Prolog? The Future of Private Antitrust Enforcement,
35 Antitrust Bull. 879, 932-33 n. 119 (1990) (arguing that free rider label is not functional
legal concept but merely conclusion that assumes that decisions on marketing belong to
manufacturer rather than dealer without explaining why this is so). The economic effi-
ciency advocates respond that vertical restrictions are often the cheapest, most efficient
way for the manufacturer to achieve his goal. See Posner, Antitrust Policy and the
Supreme Court: An Analysis of the Restricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger and Poten-
tial Competition Decisions, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 282, 294 (1975) [hereinafter Posner, Anti-
trust Policy]; Posner, The Next Step, supra note 59, at 20.
62. Some commentators include in "services" items such as advertising, showrooms,
shelf rentals, knowledgeable sales personnel, "certification" by "upscale dealers," and
avoidance of use of the product as a loss leader. See Calvani & Berg, supra note 61, at
1186-87; Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements, supra note 53, at 150; Goldberg, The Free
Rider Problem, Imperfect Pricing, and the Economics of Retailing Services, 79 Nw. U.L.
Rev. 736, 738-48 (1984). They argue that some consumers must want these services, as
proven by the fact that these consumers are willing to pay for the package that includes
them. See Baxter, supra note 58, at 946; Marvel & McCafferty, The Welfare Effects of
Resale Price Maintenance, 28 J.L. & Econ. 363, 369-72 (1985); Piraino, supra note 39, at
19-23; Popofsky & Bomse, From Sylvania to Monsanto: No Longer a "Free Ride," 30
Antitrust Bull. 67, 91-92 (1985); Posner, The Chicago School, supra note 52, at 926-30.
Other commentators, while agreeing with the basic dealer-service theory, argue that not
all such "services" are desired by the purchasing consumers. See VIII P. Areeda, supra
note 57, at 5 1611; Comanor, Vertical Price-Fixing, Vertical Market Restrictions, and the
New Antitrust Policy, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 983, 990-92 (1985); Hovenkamp, Fact, Value and
Theory in Antitrust Adjudication, 1987 Duke L.J. 897, 909-11; Levmore, Rescuing Some
Antitrust Law: An Essay on Vertical Restrictions and Consumer Information, 67 Iowa L.
Rev. 981, 986-90 (1982); Weiss, The Dealer-Services Rationale for Resale Price Mainte-
nance: Does the Manufacturer Really Know Best?, 30 St. Louis U.L.J. 517, 526-31 (1986).
63. Under this theory, vertical restraints are output enhancing in that, if the manufac-
turer is correct, the quantity of his product sold will increase because of the added dealer
services. See Calvani & Berg, supra note 61, at 1182. If the manufacturer is wrong about
consumer demand for the product and service package, sales will fall off and the manu-
facturer will make adjustments. See Baxter, supra note 58, at 945-46; Shores, Vertical
Price-Fixing and the Contract Conundrum: Beyond Monsanto, 54 Fordham L. Rev. 377,
401 (1985).
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of some of her marketing freedom and will also limit intrabrand competi-
tion among dealers of the same brand. Under an economic efficiency
approach, however, these effects are economically irrelevant and should
not trigger the application of the antitrust laws." Only if a vertical re-
straint has an effect in the horizontal interbrand market should it be a
concern to the antitrust laws.65 This will occur in the relatively rare in-
stance66 in which a vertical restraint is used to facilitate a manufacturer
or dealer cartel.67 Outside such limited situations, the law should neither
impose liability nor give a private plaintiff treble damages.68
64. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. Some commentators argue that verti-
cal restraints do not restrict intrabrand competition in an economic sense because there is
no restriction of output in the intrabrand market. See H. Hovenkamp, Economics, supra
note 4, § 9.4, at 268-69; Liebeler, supra note 4, at 18-19.
65. See R. Posner, Antitrust Law, supra note 2, at 153; Hovenkamp, Vertical Restric-
tions, supra note 61, at 529-40; Liebeler, supra note 4, at 19.
66. Adherents to the economic efficiency rationale typically argue that manufacturer
and dealer cartels are rare. See, eg., H. Hovenkamp, Economics, supra note 4, § 9.2, at
250-52 (because retail cartel reduces output, manufacturer has no motive to participate in
cartel); R. Posner, Antitrust Law, supra note 2, at 148-53 (discussing how typically verti-
cal restraints are used to enhance interbrand competition); Baxter, supra note 58, at 941-
45 (listing necessary conditions for cartel arrangements); Easterbrook, Vertical Arrange-
ments, supra note 53, at 141-43 (discussing problems in forming dealer cartel and added
problem of securing manufacturer compliance). Phillip Areeda, on the other hand, sug-
gests that dealer cartels may be more prevalent than the Supreme Court and these com-
mentators believe. See VIII P. Areeda, supra note 57, at 1604.
67. Both manufacturer and dealer cartels are anti-competitive because they are hori-
zontal arrangements that permit would-be competitors to pool their individual market
power and, thereby, mimic a monopolist. See R. Posner, Antitrust Law, supra note 2, at
153; Baker, supra note 39, at 1489; Marvel & McCafferty, supra note 62, at 365-69, 374.
In the case of a manufacturer cartel, the manufacturers use the vertical restraints as a
means of policing their cartel. See H. Hovenkamp, Economics, supra note 4, § 9.2, at
252; Calvani & Berg, supra note 61, at 1184; Piraino, supra note 39, at 14. William
Baxter argues that in order for manufacturers to use vertical restraints to facilitate a
cartel, a number of conditions must exist, including a high market concentration, signifi-
cant entry barriers, and participation of substantially all manufacturers. See Baxter,
supra note 58, at 942. In the case of a dealer cartel, it is the dealers who use the vertical
restraints to police the cartel. See H. Hovenkamp, Economics, supra note 4, § 9.2, at
248-50; R. Posner, Antitrust Law, supra note 2, at 148; Baxter, supra note 58, at 944-45;
Calvani & Berg, supra note 61, at 1184. Some commentators argue that for a dealer
cartel to be successful, it must involve dealers of competing brands; if the dealers of a
single, nonmonopoly brand cartelize and raise prices, consumers will switch brands. See
H. Hovenkamp, Economics, supra note 4, § 9.2, at 249-50; Baker, supra note 39, at 1489.
Additionally, there must be entry barriers into the particular retailing field, or the manu-
facturer would simply switch retailers. See Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements, supra
note 53, at 142; Liebeler, supra note 4, at 19-23; Marvel & McCafferty, supra note 62, at
374.
68. The advocates of the economic efficiency approach stress the importance of stand-
ing as a means of guarding against an overuse of the antitrust laws. Such overdeterrence,




A. The Application of the Economic Efficiency Approach
to Vertical Restraints
Since 1977,69 the Supreme Court has moved steadily toward an adop-
tion of this economic efficiency approach to vertical pricing, territorial,
and customer restraints. As a result, a number of facets of vertical re-
straint law have changed, the first and foremost of which is the rationale
for condemning some of these restraints. In addition, the Court has re-
vised its definition of an "agreement" in the vertical context and has re-
fined the standing doctrine. At first blush, these changes seem to
eliminate coercion as a concern in the vertical restraint area, thereby
bringing analysis of vertical restraints in line with that of horizontal re-
straints. A closer inspection, however, reveals that what has changed is
only the role that coercion plays in vertical restraint antitrust analysis.
The shift in the Supreme Court's view concerning the rationale for
condemning vertical restraints began in Sylvania7" and culminated in
Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp. 7 In these two opin-
ions, the Court signalled that it was no longer adhering to the "trader
freedom" rationale but rather was focusing on the horizontal effects and,
more specifically, the horizontal interbrand effects of the vertical re-
straint. In Sylvania, a case involving vertical territorial restrictions, the
Court acknowledged for the first time a basic tenet of the economic effi-
ciency model-that although vertical restraints may reduce intrabrand
competition, they may simultaneously "promote interbrand competition
by allowing the manufacturer to achieve certain efficiencies in the distri-
bution of his products."7 In weighing this potential increase in inter-
brand competition against the loss of "autonomy of independent
businessmen, '7 3 the Court came down squarely on the side of economic
69. The shift in the vertical restraint area was first evident in Continental T.V., Inc. v.
GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). In the same year, the Court issued its first deci-
sion on antitrust injury standing. See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429
U.S. 477 (1977); infra notes 96-101 and accompanying text.
70. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
71. 485 U.S. 717 (1988).
72. Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 54. The Court noted that "[e]conomists have identified a
number of ways in which manufacturers can use [vertical] restrictions to compete more
effectively against other manufacturers." Id. at 54-55. In particular, the Court stated:
[N]ew manufacturers ... can use the restrictions in order to induce competent
and aggressive retailers to make the kind of investment of capital and labor that
is often required in the distribution of products unknown to the consumer. Es-
tablished manufacturers can use them to induce retailers to engage in promo-
tional activities or to provide service and repair facilities necessary to the
efficient marketing of their products .... Because of market imperfections such
as the... "free rider" effect, these services might not be provided by retailers in
a purely competitive situation ....
Id. at 55. The Court also recognized that a manufacturer prefers the lowest retail price
possible and will, therefore, seek to minimize the dealer's profits, which are a cost of
distribution for the manufacturer. See id. at 56 n.24; supra note 60.
73. Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 53 n.21.
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efficiency.74 Horizontal interbrand competition, the Court stated, "is the
primary concern of antitrust law."" While vertical restrictions may im-
pede dealer freedom, "an antitrust policy divorced from market consider-
ations would lack any objective benchmarks."76
Similarly, in Sharp, the Court applied the same economic efficiency
analysis to vertical pricing restraints.77 Ignoring the potential coercive
effect of the restraint and the loss of dealer freedom,7" the Court looked
to the "new wisdom" of economic analysis to interpret a "dynamic"
Sherman Act.79 The Court reiterated that the concern of the antitrust
laws was with the "economic effects" of the restraint and, more specifi-
cally, with its tendency to facilitate horizontal interbrand cartels.' Ver-
74. Justice White in his concurring opinion noted that this was a marked change from
the Court's earlier decisions. "[C]oncern for the freedom of the businessman to dispose of
his own goods as he sees fit," Justice White stated, is a rationale that "runs through our
case law in the area of distributional restraints." Id at 67-68 (White, J., concurring).
75. Id. at 52 n.19.
76. Id. at 53 n.21. Given the potential pro-competitive benefits of vertical non-price
restraints, the Court concluded that such restraints must be judged under the rule of
reason rather than the perse rule. See id. at 58-59. In so holding, the Court overruled its
earlier decision in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
A number of commentators have criticized the Sylvania decision for failing to give any
meaningful guidance for applying the rule of reason to vertical non-price restraints. See
H. Hovenkamp, Economics, supra note 4, § 9.4, at 269; Posner, The Next Step, supra
note 59, at 8, 14-18. Some commentators argue that a better approach than the rule of
reason would be to regard all vertical restraints as per se or presumptively legal. See IR
Bork, supra note 2, at 288; Baxter, supra note 58, at 947; Easterbrook, Vertical Arrange-
ments, supra note 53, at 135; Piraino, supra note 39, at 19; Posner, The Next Step, supra
note 59, at 23-28; see also H. Hovenkamp, Economics, supra note 4, § 5.4, at 144 (dis-
cussing view of Chicago School).
77. The issue in Sharp was whether an agreement to terminate a price-cutting dealer
was an agreement to fix prices or, in other words, whether vertical "price fixing" requires
the fixing of some specific price or price level. See Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs.
Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 722-23 (1988).
78. Neither the majority nor the dissent in Sharp even alluded to dealer freedom as a
possible ground for condemning a vertical restraint. The dissent's disagreement with the
majority was, in part, over the economic harm stemming from the loss of intrabrand
competition. The dissenting justices, in contrast to the majority, thought the loss of in-
trabrand competition was a sufficient economic reason to condemn, per se, a vertical
restraint.
[A]lthough the majority neglects to mention it, fostering intrabrand competi-
tion has been recognized as an important goal of antitrust law, and although a
manufacturer's efficiency-enhancing vertical nonprice restraints may subject a
reduction of intrabrand competition only to a rule of reason analysis, a similar
reduction without the procompetitive "redeeming virtues" of manufacturer-im-
posed vertical nonprice restraints... causes nothing but economic harm.
Sharp, 485 U.S. at 749 n.14 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent also argued that the
restraint in question was essentially horizontal since it was instigated by one dealer seek-
ing to have another dealer terminated. See id. at 745-47 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
79. See id. at 732.
80. See id. at 726. At least to justify the imposition of per se illegality, the Court
stated, there must be "demonstrable economic effect, such as the facilitating of cartelizing
.... " Id. at 726. Throughout its opinion, the Court made clear that it regarded the
horizontal interbrand cartel to be the chief (if not sole) evil that the antitrust laws were
intended to prohibit. The majority reiterated the statement from Sylvania that "inter-
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tical restraints, according to the Court, were per se illegal only when they
were likely to have a horizontal "cartel-facilitating"'" effect and, absent
such an effect, a court should not condemn a vertical restraint 2 since it
may have a "real potential to stimulate interbrand competition."8"
At the same time the Court was eliminating coercion from the ration-
ale for condemning vertical restraints, it also seemingly excised coercion
brand competition is the primary concern of the antitrust laws," id. at 726, and added
that "a rule of per se illegality ...[is] not needed or effective to protect intrabrand
competition." Id. at 725. Indeed, vertical price restraints had been treated as per se
illegal because "there was support for the proposition that [such] restraints reduce inter-
brand price competition because they 'facilitate cartelizing.'" Id. at 725. In particular,
vertical price fixing "might assist horizontal price fixing at the manufacturer level (by
reducing the manufacturer's incentive to cheat on a cartel, since its retailers could not
pass on lower prices to consumers) or might be used to organize cartels at the retailer
level." Id. at 725-26. Vertical non-price restraints were only subject to rule of reason
scrutiny because "[s]imilar support for the cartel-facilitating effect of [these] restraints
was and remains lacking." Id. at 726. Echoing the views of the economic efficiency
advocates, the Court gratuitously added: "Cartels are neither easy to form nor easy to
maintain." Id. at 727; see supra note 66.
81. The Court did not regard the purely vertical effect-the constraint on the
dealer-as anti-competitive. The Court asserted that "all anti-competitive effects are by
definition horizontal effects." Sharp, 485 U.S. at 730 n.4.
82. See id. at 726. The Court left open the question of whether a rule of reason
challenge to a vertical restraint could be based on something other than a showing of
economic inefficiency. Cf. Burns, supra note 39, at 28 n. 190, 37-38 (arguing that logically
it makes no sense to permit rule of reason challenge based on non-economic "goals" of
antitrust laws).
83. See Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 724 (1988). In
dealing with the precise issue before it, the Court held that an agreement to terminate a
price-cutting dealer without an agreement on subsequent resale prices was not a per se
illegal price fixing agreement because it was unlikely that such an arrangement provided
any significant assistance to cartelizing.
Without an agreement with the remaining dealer on price, the manufacturer
both retains its incentive to cheat on any manufacturer-level cartel (since lower
prices can still be passed on to consumers) and cannot as easily be used to or-
ganize and hold together a retailer-level cartel.
Id. at 727. The Court was also concerned that without a requirement for an agreement
on a specific resale price to be charged, any non-price restraint could be portrayed as a
price restraint.
Any agreement between a manufacturer and a dealer to terminate another
dealer who happens to have charged lower prices can be alleged to have been
directed against the terminated dealer's "price cutting." . . . [P]rice cutting and
some measure of service cutting usually go hand in hand. . . . [A]ll vertical
restraints... have the potential to allow dealers to increase "prices" and can be
characterized as intended to achieve just that.
Id. at 727-28. Here again, the Court was picking up on a point made repeatedly by the
economic efficiency proponents-that price and non-price vertical restraints were simply
two sides of the same coin. See Allison, An Analysis of the Vertical Price-Nonprice Dichot-
omy, 21 Akron L. Rev. 131, 163-65 (1987); Baker, supra note 39, at 1467; Hay, supra
note 59, at 429-30; Posner, The Next Step, supra note 59, at 10.
Some commentators contend that although the Court in Sharp sought to adopt the
economic efficiency approach, its holding-that specific prices must be set for there to be
vertical price fixing-is illogical and conflicts with that very approach. See Burns, supra
note 39, at 27-31; Liebeler, Resale Price Maintenance and Consumer Welfare: Business
Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 36 UCLA L. Rev. 889, 895-96 (1989).
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from the agreement element of the vertical arrangement. The change in
the Court's view regarding the vertical agreement came about in Mon-
santo Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp.," where a manufacturer had re-
ceived complaints from some of its distributors about a discounting
distributor and had subsequently terminated its relations with the dis-
counter. In holding that such evidence by itself was insufficient for a jury
to find an agreement between the manufacturer and complaining distrib-
utors, 5 the Court again echoed the view of the economic efficiency pro-
ponents that a manufacturer may have a "legitimate" and "strongly felt
concern about resale prices." 6 Indeed, "in order to assure an efficient
distribution system," the Court stated, "manufacturers and distributors
constantly must coordinate their activities to assure that their product
will reach the customer persuasively and efficiently."8" Complaints from
distributors about other price-cutting distributors are a "natural" part of
this exchange of information and by themselves "do not indicate con-
certed action.""8 In order for an agreement to be shown, the Court
84. 465 U.S. 752 (1984). Monsanto was the Supreme Court's first decision dealing
squarely with the "agreement" element of a vertical restraint since Albrecht v. Herald
Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968). The Court had been able to sidestep the agreement issue in
Sylvania because the parties there stipulated to the presence of an agreement. See Conti-
nental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 40 n.8 (1977). Later in Sharp (which
came down four years after Monsanto) the Court was able to avoid confronting directly
the agreement issue because the jury had found an agreement existed and Sharp did not
challenge this particular finding on appeal. See Sharp, 485 U.S. at 722. The Court's
rationale in Sharp, however, has implications for the agreement element and is fundamen-
tally at odds with the Monsanto decision. See Burns, supra note 39, at 29-31; infra note
129 and accompanying text.
85. Although the Court held that the evidence of complaints and subsequent action
was by itself insufficient as a matter of law to support the jury's finding of an agreement,
see Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 763-64, the Court also held that sufficient additional evidence
had been presented so the jury's finding of agreement could stand. See id. at 765-68. A
number of commentators have suggested that the two parts of the Court's opinion are in
conflict. See eg., Calvani & Berg, supra note 61, at 1193-97 (Court's treatment of evi-
dence in Monsanto as sufficient is inconsistent with "tenor of its rhetoric"); Floyd, Verti-
cal Antitrust Conspiracies After Monsanto and Russell Stover, 33 U. Kan. L Rev. 269,
285-87 (1985) (Monsanto Court relied on "admittedly ambiguous evidence of communi-
cation of agreement by distributors").
86. Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 762-63. In particular, a manufacturer may be "at-
tempt[ing] to further a particular market[ ] strategy by means of agreements [with his
distributors] on often costly nonprice restrictions." Id. at 762. In describing such a situa-
tion, the Court adopted, in large part, the economic efficiency view of the typical vertical
restraint.
The manufacturer often will want to ensure that its distributors earn sufficient
profit to pay for programs such as hiring and training additional salesman or
demonstrating the technical feature of a product, and will want to see that 'free
riders' do not interfere.
Id. at 762-63; see supra note 61.
87. Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 763-64.
88. Id. at 763. Similarly, the manufacturer's action in response to dealer complaints
could be simply "management's exercise of its independent business judgment." Id. at
764 (quoting Edward J. Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 637 F.2d 105, 111 n.2 (3d
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 911 (1981)). The Court in Monsanto thus characterized
the communications between the manufacturer and its dealers as "unilateral action"
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stated, the plaintiff must show "something more" than complaints and
conforming action. 9 In particular, a vertical arrangement amounted to
an "agreement" when there was "a conscious commitment to a common
scheme."90 Specifically, the Court, quoting from a horizontal conspiracy
case, held that the "[c]ircumstances must reveal 'a unity of purpose or a
common design and understanding, or a meeting of minds in an unlawful
arrangement.' "91 As if to underscore the fact that it was now looking
for a non-coercive agreement in the vertical context, as it did in the hori-
zontal context, the Court noted that a dealer acted unilaterally if she
grudgingly complied with a manufacturer's demands in order to avoid
termination.92 Thus, just as Sylvania and Sharp had shown that coercion
of the dealer qua buyer/victim was not an adequate rationale for con-
demning a vertical restraint, so too Monsanto indicated that coercion of
the dealer qua co-conspirator would not be evidence of an agreement.
The third area in which the Supreme Court seemingly removed, or at
least limited, the role of coercion was in its development of the antitrust-
injury component of standing. As with the shift in rationales, this devel-
opment also reflected the Court's continued adoption of an economic effi-
ciency approach to antitrust analysis. According to economic theory, a
particular activity can have simultaneously both pro-competitive and
anti-competitive effects. 93 Antitrust awards need to be limited to those
damages that can be traced to an inefficient aspect of the activity.94 Ap-
plying the antitrust laws more broadly, the argument goes, will result in
under Colgate. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. One commentator has noted
that the Monsanto decision may have "breathe[d] more life into Colgate than it had even
in 1918." Hay, supra note 59, at 434; see also Floyd, supra note 85, at 273-85 (criticizing
Court for misapplying Colgate in Monsanto); Shores, supra note 63, at 398-400 (same).
89. See Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 764 (1984). The evi-
dence of complaints was some probative evidence, but "the burden remains on the anti-
trust plaintiff to introduce additional evidence sufficient to support a finding of an
unlawful contract, combination, or conspiracy." Id. at 764 n.8.
90. Id. at 764 (quoting Edward J. Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 637 F.2d 105,
111 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 911 (1981)).
91. Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 764 (quoting American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328
U.S. 781, 810 (1946)). Applying this test in the vertical context meant "more than a
showing that the distributor conformed to the suggested price. It means as well that
evidence must be presented both that the distributor communicated its acquiescence or
agreement, and that this was sought by the manufacturer." Id. at 764 n.9.
92. Under Colgate, the manufacturer can announce its resale prices in advance
and refuse to deal with those who fail to comply. And a distributor is free to
acquiesce in the manufacturer's demands in order to avoid termination.
Id. at 761.
93. A merger, for instance, might be harmful in that it increases market power and, at
the same time, be beneficial in creating efficiencies. For an economic analysis of standing
to challenge mergers, see Hovenkamp, Merger Actions, supra note 56. Alternatively,
practices that look superficially identical can be economically efficient or inefficient de-
pending upon the surrounding circumstances. Resale price maintenance, for instance,
would be pro-competitive if established by a manufacturer wishing to enhance his posi-
tion in the interbrand market but would be anti-competitive if established by manufactur-
ers in order to facilitate a cartel. See supra notes 61-67 and accompanying text.
94. See Page, Antitrust Damages, supra note 50, at 471-76; Page, The Scope of Liabil-
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overdeterrence-businesses will be discouraged from undertaking the ec-
onomically efficient practices that robust competition needs.95
In its 1977 decision in Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc. ,96
the Supreme Court began constructing a standing doctrine that would
avoid just such overdeterrence. 97 In Brunswick, a merger case, the Court
held that a private antitrust plaintiff could not recover merely by show-
ing an antitrust violation and injury to himself."8 In addition, the plain-
tiff must show "antitrust injury"-that he was injured by "that which
makes defendants' acts unlawful."9 9 Without such a standing limit, "
the Court stated, damage recovery under the antitrust laws would be
"entirely fortuitous" and "divorce[d] ... from the purposes of the anti-
trust laws."' 101
Recently, in Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co.,102 the
ity, supra note 9, at 1452-53, 1460-64; Easterbrook & Fischel, Antitrust Suits by Targets of
Tender Offers, 80 Mich. L. Rev. 1155, 1160 (1982).
95. See Landes, Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust Violations, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 652,
655 (1983); Page, The Scope of Liability, supra note 9, at 1451-53; Page, Optimal Antitrust
Penalties, supra note 56, at 2151.
96. 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
97. The Brunswick decision, authored by Justice Marshall, was to some extent fore-
shadowed by Justice Marshall's concurring opinion in Perma Life. Justice Marshall
agreed that the in pari delicto doctrine should not bar a dealer who "did not actively seek
out or support all the anti-competitive restraints embodied in the franchise." Perma Life
Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 149 (1968) (Marshall, J., con-
curring). Justice Marshall, however, was troubled about permitting recovery to the ex-
tent a restraint benefitted the dealer. "I cannot agree that the public interest requires that
a plaintiff who has actively sought to bring about illegal restraints on competition for his
own benefit be permitted to demand redress.. . ." Id. at 151 (Marshall, J., concurring).
98. In Brunswick, three bowling center operators brought a suit for damages against
Brunswick, a large bowling equipment company which had acquired a number of failing
bowling centers. The plaintiffs alleged that these acquisitions were illegal under § 7 of the
Clayton Act and claimed as damages the profits that they would have made had the
acquired centers been allowed to go out of business. The jury found a violation of § 7 and
awarded damages. See Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 479-82.
99. Id. at 489. According to the Court, the antitrust injury requirement came from
§ 4 of the Clayton Act which limits treble damages to "a person who shall be injured in
his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws." Id. at 488
(emphasis added).
100. The antitrust-injury standing requirement was in addition to the other antitrust
standing requirements, such as a showing of proximate causation. See Associated Gen.
Contractors v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 529-38 (1983); Blue
Shield v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 477 (1982); Blair & Harrison, Rethinking Antitrust
Injury, 42 Vand. L. Rev. 1539, 1551 (1989); Polden, Antitrust Standing and the Rule
Against Resale Price Maintenance, 37 Clev. St. L. Rev. 179, 204-205 (1989).
101. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 487 (1977). The
antitrust injury requirement thus serves the same purpose that the zone-of-interest re-
quirement serves in other areas of standing law-it limits standing to those persons who
can show that their injury was the type the statute was meant to prohibit. In Cargill, Inc.
v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 104 (1986), the Court applied the antitrust injury
requirement to a private plaintiff seeking to enjoin a merger.
102. 110 S. Ct. 1884 (1990). In USA Petroleum, an independent marketer of gasoline
sued a gasoline producer for allegedly conspiring with the producer's dealers to fix maxi-
mum (but non-predatory) resale prices. The plaintiff, a competitor of the conspiring deal-
ers, alleged that it lost profits as a result of the lower prices set by the defendant gasoline
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Supreme Court applied the same reasoning to vertical restraints. Noting
that even actions that are per se illegal "may nonetheless have some
procompetitive effects," the Court explained that the antitrust injury re-
quirement ensures "that a plaintiff can recover only if the loss stems from
an [sic] competition-reducing aspect or effect of the defendant's
behavior."1°3
The antitrust injury requirement, when viewed in conjunction with the
Court's shift in rationales for condemning vertical restraints, 104 acts as a
significant refinement of and limitation on the Court's statements in
Perma Life." 5 Perma Life had suggested that if the dealer alleged a vio-
lation and coercion, the dealer could get her case into court and over-
come any in pari delicto defense. The only other requirement seemed to
be a showing of some causal connection between the dealer's injury and
the vertical restraint." 6 Brunswick and USA Petroleum taken together
add an important caveat-they tell the dealer that the antitrust laws do
not provide a remedy for all injuries that are causally connected to sub-
stantive violations, and that while coercion may get the dealer past the in
pari delicto bar, coercion will not necessarily ensure that the dealer fulfill
the antitrust-injury standing requirement. 10 7 Coercion, while perhaps
producer and its dealers. For discussions of the question of competitor standing in maxi-
mum resale price maintenance cases, see Blair & Harrison, supra note 100, at 1552-56;
Polden, supra note 100, at 213-26.
103. USA Petroleum, 110 S. Ct. at 1894. The Court noted that even per se illegal
conduct "may have three effects, often interwoven: in some respects the conduct may
reduce competition, in other respects it may increase competition, and in still other re-
spects effects may be neutral as to competition." Id.
The Court in USA Petroleum was noticeably less concerned than the Court had been in
Perma Life about preserving the private right of action, see supra note 49.
We decline to dilute the antitrust injury requirement because we find that there
is no need to encourage private enforcement by competitors of the rule against
vertical, maximum price-fixing. If such a scheme causes the anti-competitive
consequences detailed in Albrecht, consumers and the manufacturers' own deal-
ers may bring suit.
USA Petroleum, 110 S. Ct. at 1895. The dissenting justices, however, lamented that "bar-
ring competitor standing leaves enforcement of the 'vast majority of unlawful maximum
resale price agreement' in the hands of 'an unenthusiastic Department of Justice and,
under certain circumstances, the dealers who are parties to the resale price maintenance
agreement.'" Id. at 1903 n.20 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
104. See supra notes 70-83 and accompanying text. The antitrust injury requirement
looks to whether the harm alleged "corresponds to the rationale for finding a violation of
the antitrust laws in the first place ...." USA Petroleum, 110 S. Ct. at 1893. By doing
so, this standing requirement incorporates the Court's teachings regarding the reason for
condemning a particular activity.
105. See supra notes 44-50 and accompanying text.
106. See Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 140
(1968).
107. While USA Petroleum dealt specifically with the right of a competitor to challenge
maximum resale prices, the reasoning of the case applies equally to the garden-variety
vertical lawsuit in which a dealer complains that she was forced by her own manufacturer
to abide by vertical restraints. Indeed, noting the expansive implications of the antitrust-
injury standing requirement, one critic of the economic efficiency approach commented
that the standing doctrine is "growing like a noxious weed" in aititrust and is a confusing
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showing that the dealer did not instigate the restraint, does not necessar-
ily indicate the presence of a horizontal interbrand cartel-the rationale,
according to Sylvania and Sharp, for making a vertical restraint illegal.108
The Supreme Court's apparent elimination of coercion from the ra-
tionale, agreement, and standing elements of vertical restraints is consis-
tent with another, often implicit, aspect of the economic efficiency
approach-the avoidance of subjective facts in determining the legality of
a restraint. Mistrusting the ability of a jury to assess subjective facts
(such as whether the dealer was coerced), economic efficiency adherents
tend to construct tests of legality that turn on seemingly "hard" facts like
market definition and market power." 9 Increasingly, the Supreme Court
has shown a similar reluctance to allow antitrust determinations to turn
on a jury's assessment of a party's motivation or state of mind."10
B. Coercion's New Role in Vertical Restraints
In light of the Court's recent decisions, coercion appears to be largely
eradicated from vertical restraints. But can coercion be so easily dis-
missed? And should it be? Put another way, even assuming a continued
adherence to the economic efficiency approach, has the Supreme Court
mistakenly thrown out the baby of coercion with the bath water of trader
freedom? Two interrelated factors combine to show that coercion does
indeed still have a role to play in vertical restraints."' The first is the
doctrine that allows a court to make decisions on the merits of a case and the meaning of
the substantive law without saying so. See Flynn, supra note 61, at 902.
108. See supra notes 70-83 and accompanying text. In USA Petroleum the Court also
put to rest the suggestion in the early vertical restraint cases that disruption of the market
might be a sufficient rationale for condemning such activity. See supra note 29. In USA
Petroleum the Court noted:
The antitrust injury requirement cannot be met by broad allegations of harm to
the "market" as an abstract entity. Although all antitrust violations. .. "dis-
tort" the market, not every loss stemming from a violation counts as antitrust
injury.
USA Petroleum, 110 S. Ct. at 1892 n.8.
109. See H. Hovenkamp, Economics, supra note 4, § 9.4, at 271; Easterbrook, Vertical
Arrangements, supra note 53, at 157-68; Hay, supra note 59, at 441-42.
110. In Sharp, for instance, the Court stated that "[iln the vast majority of cases, it will
be extremely difficult for the manufacturer to convince a jury that its motivation [in ter-
minating a dealer] was to ensure adequate services.... Accordingly a manufacturer that
agrees to give one dealer an exclusive territory and terminates another dealer... exposes
itself to the highly plausible claim that its real motivation was to terminate a price cut-
ter." Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 727-28 (1988). Similarly,
in City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., Il l S. Ct. 1344, 1351 n.5 (1991),
the Court expressed doubt as to whether "a jury composed of citizens of the vicinage"
would be able to distinguish between independent and concerted action by a municipality.
In his Sharp dissent, Justice Stevens was not so pessimistic about the jury's ability to
discern the motive of the manufacturer: "Proof of motivation is another commonplace in
antitrust litigation of which the majority appears apprehensive, but as we have explained
or demonstrated many times.... in antitrust, as in many other areas of the law, motiva-
tion matters and factfinders are able to distinguish bad from good intent." Sharp, 485
U.S. at 753-54 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
111. Some might say that worrying about the refinements of a vertical-restraints law-
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need, under an economically-based approach, to sort out efficient (and
pro-competitive) vertical restraints from inefficient (and legally objection-
able) ones. 12 The second related factor is the antitrust-injury doctrine,
which incorporates the economic efficiency rationale and limits standing
to those persons harmed by an inefficient aspect of the restraint." 3  In
sorting out efficient from inefficient vertical restraints, a court must keep
in mind that, according to economic theory, a manufacturer typically
acts alone, and often without consultation with his dealer, in making the
decision to impose a vertical restraint." 4 The dealer, being on a different
level of the distribution chain, may well have a conflicting economic in-
terest 15 and may be pleased with or opposed to the vertical restraint
depending on the circumstances.' 16 Specifically, with a manufacturer-
suit today is a little like rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic. After Monsanto and
Sharp, fewer such cases are likely to be brought. See McArthur & Paterson, supra note
43, at 343-47. One antitrust practitioner has noted that when plaintiffs come to his office
with prospective vertical restraint cases, "we give them a cold cup of coffee, validate their
parking, and get them out pretty quickly." 60 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No.
1512, at 533 (Apr. 18, 1991) (quoting Maxwell M. Blecher). However, until and unless
the Supreme Court declares all vertical restraints to be per se legal (or presumptively so),
vertical cases will continue to be brought. With that in mind, it is still worthwhile to
consider what type of evidence is pertinent to establishing an illegal vertical restraint.
The lower courts have shown particular confusion as to what role, if any, coercion is to
play after Monsanto. See Belfiore v. New York Times Co., 826 F.2d 177, 182 (2d Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1067 (1988); Garment Dist., Inc. v. Belk Stores Servs., Inc.,
799 F.2d 905, 909-10 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1005 (1988); O.S.C. Corp. v.
Apple Computer, Inc., 792 F.2d 1464, 1467 (9th Cir. 1986); World of Sleep, Inc. v. La-Z-
Boy Chair Co., 756 F.2d 1467, 1476-77 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 823 (1985).
112. The courts could avoid this sorting-out process, of course, if the Supreme Court
adopted Richard Posner's suggestion that vertical restraints be treated asperse legal. See
supra note 76. So far, however, the Supreme Court has not indicated that it is willing to
take that step.
113. For a discussion of the fundamental differences between the horizontal and verti-
cal restraints, see Bums, supra note 39, at 10-16.
114. Indeed, both proponents and critics of the economic efficiency model agree that
typically vertical restraints are imposed by a manufacturer acting in his own self-interest
and are often thrust upon unwilling dealers. See, e.g., Hay, supra note 59, at 422 (manu-
facturer benefits when retail margins are kept to minimum sustainable; manufacturer im-
poses vertical restraints because they benefit him); Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements,
supra note 53, at 146-48 (noting that manufacturer wants to keep his cost of distribution
down in order to sell more units); Posner, The Next Step, supra note 59, at 11-12 (noting
that manufacturer imposes vertical restraints to induce dealers into providing greater
services to consumers and to eliminate free-riding by discounting dealers); Flynn, supra
note 53, at 1144 (arguing that vertical price-fixing impairs "the independence of traders
to set their own price and the concomitant public interest in receiving the benefit of one's
individual effort"); Weiss, supra note 62, at 526-31 (arguing that resale price maintenance
agreements do not achieve optimal price-service combinations as would competitive mar-
ket). The two camps disagree, however, over whether such manufacturer-imposed verti-
cal restraints benefit consumers or society.
115. In imposing the vertical restraint, the manufacturer acts to increase his own reve-
nues but not necessarily those of the dealers. While the manufacturer will want the
dealer to be profitable, he will want to limit the dealer to a competitive return. See supra
note 60.
116. See Bums, supra note 39, at 13-16.
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imposed vertical restraint, 1 7 there are five possible scenarios:
(1) the manufacturer imposed the restraint to increase interbrand
sales, and the dealer agreed to the restraint because the dealer
saw the wisdom of selling a package of product plus service;I1 8
(2) the manufacturer imposed the restraint to increase interbrand
sales, but the dealer resisted the restraint because the dealer dis-
agreed with the manufacturer's assumption that consumers
want and will pay for service in addition to product;' 9
(3) the manufacturer imposed the restraint to increase interbrand
sales, but the dealer resisted the restraint because the dealer
wanted to free ride on full-service dealers; 2
(4) the manufacturer imposed the restraint to facilitate a manufac-
turer cartel, but the dealer objected because the dealer will re-
ceive none of the monopoly profits;' 2' and
117. Four corresponding scenarios are possible if there is a dealer-inspired vertical re-
straint. The dealers are (1) acting to increase interbrand sales, and the manufacturer
agrees with the marketing strategy; (2) acting to increase interbrand sales, but the manu-
facturer resists because he disagrees with the marketing strategy; (3) acting to facilitate a
dealer cartel, but the manufacturer resists because the manufacturer will receive none of
the monopoly profits; or (4) acting to facilitate a dealer cartel, and the manufacturer
agrees because the manufacturer has been bought off by the cartel.
118. The dealer in this situation expects to benefit not by getting monopoly profits but
by selling more units (with a competitive rate of return on each unit). See H.
Hovenkamp, Economics, supra note 4, § 9.2, at 248-49; R. Posner, Antitrust Law, supra
note 2, at 156-57; Liebeler, supra note 4, at 25. Because both the manufacturer and
dealer prosper (at competitive returns) when vertical restraints are set to maximize the
product's standing on the interbrand market, Richard Posner contends that coercion of
the dealer is less frequent than the Supreme Court decisions suggest. See R. Posner,
supra note 2, at 156-57.
119. If the manufacturer, for instance, sets the resale price too high and consumers in
fact do not want the added service, sales in the interbrand market will decline and the
dealer will suffer. Dealers who are faced with what they believe to be poorly-planned
vertical restraints thus have a legitimate and pro-competitive reason for resisting the re-
straints and making their views known. See Liebeler, supra note 4, at 25. The Supreme
Court recognized this point in Monsanto. See Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp.,
465 U.S. 752, 762-64 (1984); see also Lomar Wholesale Grocery, Inc. v. Dieter's Gourmet
Foods, Inc., 824 F.2d 582, 593 (8th Cir. 1987) ("The distributor may have a better under-
standing than his supplier of which intrabrand restraints will most significantly enhance
the interbrand competitiveness of the supplier's goods at the retail level."), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 1010 (1988). The manufacturer who sets the resale price too high will also
suffer (through lost sales) and will eventually adjust the resale price and the mix of prod-
uct and service he is offering. See supra note 63.
120. According to economic theory, the dealer's resistance here is inefficient. See supra
note 63. To the extent consumers want the product alone without the service (and there-
fore at a cheaper price) they can switch to other brands that are competing on price
alone.
121. The members of the cartel, whether on the manufacturer or dealer level, reap the
monopoly profits from the cartel. The party on the non-cartelized level will not typically
benefit from the cartel and can, therefore, be expected to resist the restraints. See VIII P.
Areeda, supra note 57, 1 1603, at 36; Baxter, supra note 58, at 938; Calvani & Berg, supra
note 61, at 1184; Marvel & McCafferty, supra note 62, at 374-77; see also Easterbrook,
Vertical Arrangements, supra note 53, at 142 ("A manufacturer that helps dealers form a
cartel is doing itself in. It will sell less, and dealers will get the monopoly profits.").
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(5) the manufacturer imposed the restraint to facilitate a manufac-
turer cartel, and the dealer agreed because the dealer had been
bought off by the cartel.122
Under the economic efficiency approach, vertical pricing, territorial,
and customer restraints are anti-competitive (and a concern for the anti-
trust laws) only in the fourth and fifth scenarios-where there is a cartel
at one level of the distribution chain. 123 Furthermore, only dealers in the
fourth scenario (and those in the fifth who refused to be bought off) have
standing in the sense of antitrust injury, because only they have been
injured by that which justifies making vertical restraints illegal in the first
place-a cartel.124
What also becomes immediately evident from this list is that the pres-
ence or absence of coercion will be some indication of whether the re-
straint is actionable under the antitrust laws. In the case of a lawsuit
brought by a dealer, the absence of coercion is particularly significant.
Specifically, where there is no coercion and the dealer freely agreed to the
restraint, there are only two explanations, neither of which will give rise
to a viable dealer lawsuit. The first (and more likely) explanation is that
the situation could be within scenario # 1-the vertical restraint was one
that both the manufacturer and the dealer saw as enhancing the prod-
uct's ability to compete on the interbrand market.1 25 Such an efficient,
122. Some commentators argue that cartelizing dealers cannot buy the manufacturer's
cooperation because the manufacturer can keep all the monopoly profits to itself by get-
ting new dealers or by vertically integrating. See H. Hovenkamp, Economics, supra note
4, § 9.2, at 250; E. Sullivan & J. Harrison, Understanding Antitrust and Its Economic
Implications 159 (1988); Marvel & McCafferty, supra note 62, at 374-76.
123. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text. In the case of dealer-inspired verti-
cal restraints, the restraints are similarly inefficient when used to facilitate a cartel. See
scenarios #3 and #4, supra note 117.
124. See supra notes 102-08 and accompanying text. The dealer would have to show
that she lost business because of the presence of the manufacturer cartel. The dealer
could not, however, sue for a cut of the monopoly profits made by the cartelizing manu-
facturers; rather, the dealer's recovery would be the difference between projected profits
under a competitive market and her actual profits under the cartelized market. See, e.g.,
Local Beauty Supply, Inc. v. Lamaur Inc., 787 F.2d 1197, 1202-03 (7th Cir. 1986) (dis-
counting dealer who alleges minimum resale price maintenance cannot recover damages
that assume continuation of allegedly illegally-set resale prices).
Similarly, in the case of a dealer-inspired vertical restraint, a plaintiff manufacturer
would need to show that he resisted the cartel (in other words, he was within scenario
#3, supra note 117) and that his damages were traceable to the presence of the dealer
cartel. Like the dealer, the manufacturer could not sue for a piece of the monopoly
profits.
125. Similarly, in the purely vertical boycott (where, for instance, a dealer persuades a
number of different manufacturers not to deal with a competing dealer but there is no
agreement among the manufacturers) the agreement between each manufacturer and the
complaining dealer is likely to be coerced. Additionally, evidence of an absence of coer-
cion will likely show a manufacturer who has acted unilaterally and therefore legally. See
Dunnivant v. Bi-State Auto Parts, 851 F.2d 1575, 1581-82 (11 th Cir. 1988). Indeed, a
number of courts have recently held that such a purely vertical boycott is, in essence, a
vertical non-price restraint and should be analyzed as such. See, e.g., Thurman Indus. v.
Pay 'N Pak Stores, Inc., 875 F.2d 1369, 1373-74 (9th Cir. 1989) (where plaintiff-retailer
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pro-competitive restraint obviously should not be subject to antitrust at-
tack. Indeed, the complying dealer lacks standing to challenge it because
she will be unable to trace any alleged injury to an economic ineffi-
ciency.126 The only other explanation for an agreeing-dealer situation-
scenario #5, the bought-off dealer-would similarly produce a dealer
without antitrust-injury standing. Here, there would be a manufacturer
cartel (and therefore an inefficient vertical restraint), but having benefit-
ted from the cartel by receiving a part of the monopoly profits, the dealer
could not show injury traceable to that inefficiency. 2 ' Instead, the
dealer who can show an economically inefficient vertical restraint and
injury linked to that inefficiency is likely to be a dealer who was coerced
into accepting the restraint 28 (scenario #4 or #5). 111
Saying this does not mean that coercion resumes the pivotal position
that it once had. Not only is coercion no longer evil in itself, but evi-
dence of coercion is also not always indicative of an economically-ineffi-
cient restraint-namely, one used to facilitate a cartel. In particular,
evidence of simply a dealer's own individual coercion will rarely reflect a
manufacturer cartel. On the contrary, individual coercion is likely symp-
tomatic of either an honest disagreement over marketing strategies or a
dealer's desire to free-ride (scenario #2 or #3), neither of which indi-
cates an inefficient vertical restraint. 3 Individual coercion will be con-
alleges that competing retailer pressured suppliers into not dealing with plaintiff, plaintiff
must put forth full rule-of-reason case); Key Fin. Planning Corp. v. ITT Life Ins. Corp.,
828 F.2d 635, 640-41 (10th Cir. 1987) (vertical boycott subject to rule-of-reason analy-
sis); Lomar Wholesale Grocery, Inc. v. Dieter's Gourmet Foods, Inc., 824 F.2d 582, 590-
92 (8th Cir. 1987) (same).
126. Similarly, in the case of a dealer-inspired vertical restraint, the manufacturer who
agreed to the vertical restraint because he concurred in the dealers' marketing strategy,
see scenario # 1, supra note 117, would lack standing to challenge this pro-competitive
restraint.
127. So too, the manufacturer who was bought off by a dealer cartel, see scenario #4,
supra note 117, lacks standing for the same reason.
128. Once again, the situation is the same with a dealer-inspired vertical restraint. The
manufacturer who can show a dealer cartel and injury stemming from that cartel will
likely be a manufacturer who was coerced into accepting the restraint. See VII P. Areeda,
supra note 7, at 1457; VIII P. Areeda, supra note 57, at 1603; Baxter, supra note 58, at
944; scenario #3, supra note 117.
The only other economically inefficient vertical pricing restraint is a maximum resale
price set below cost by a manufacturer in order to engage in predatory pricing. Here too,
coercion of the dealers is likely to be present if the dealers will be incurring losses on their
sales. See eg., Rebel Oil Co. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 1990-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
69,258, at 64,950 (D. Nev. 1990) (competing dealer alleges that oil company coerced its
dealers into charging maximum prices which were also predatory).
129. Thus, the economic efficiency rationale, which the Supreme Court embraced in
Sylvania and Sharp, is in flat contradiction to the Monsanto Court's condemnation of
"common plan" agreements. The vertical arrangement that the economic efficiency pro-
ponents paint as the most clearly pro-competitive (scenario # 1) will typically involve the
very agreement that Monsanto condemns. Conversely, most economically inefficient ver-
tical restraints (scenario #4), moreover, involve a coerced agreement. Put simply, Mon-
santo is wrong. See Bums, supra note 39, at 29-31, 33-34.
130. Similarly, evidence of a single manufacturer's resistance to dealer-inspired vertical
1991]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60
sistent with an inefficient restraint only in the unlikely situation where
there is a manufacturer cartel that has bought off most dealers but not
the plaintiff-dealer (a modified scenario #5).11 This does not mean,
however, that coercion evidence has no value at all. Evidence of wide-
spread dealer coercion does provide some indication of the presence of a
manufacturer cartel (scenario #4).132 Additionally, the dealer who of-
fers evidence of both widespread dealer coercion and her own resistance
has shown some indication of an inefficient restraint and her own
standing. 133
Yet even the use of widespread coercion evidence needs further refine-
ment. Such evidence is neither sufficient in itself nor always necessary to
show that manufacturers are using a vertical restraint to facilitate a car-
tel. It is not sufficient because widespread dealer coercion could also be
consistent with scenario #2-where dealers disagree with the manufac-
turer's marketing strategy. Moreover, if the manufacturer's marketing
strategy is wrongheaded, the manufacturer might well meet with resist-
ance from some, or even most, dealers."' Yet widespread resistance in
this situation is in no way reflective of a manufacturer cartel and, under
the economic efficiency theory, the restraint ought not be subject to anti-
trust attack.1
35
Nor is widespread coercion evidence always necessary to prove the
presence of a cartel. In particular, it will be unnecessary in some in-
stances in which a consumer, as opposed to a dealer, brings the law-
suit.' 36  In most consumer lawsuits involving inefficient vertical
restraints is likely reflective of nothing more than an honest disagreement over marketing
strategy. See scenario #2, supra note 117.
131. If manufacturer or dealer cartels are rare, see supra note 66, then cartels in which
parties on another level of distribution are bought off are likely to be even rarer. See
supra notes 121-22. If we then look for a manufacturer cartel with bought-off dealers but
a morally righteous (but fiscally crazed) dealer who refuses to be bought off, we are
searching for a rare bird indeed.
132. Similarly, evidence that manufacturers of different brands have received requests
from their respective dealers for vertical restraints and evidence of widespread manufac-
turer resistance to such restraints would be strong evidence of a dealer cartel.
133. The dealer's own individual resistance is evidence that she was not bought off by
the cartelizing manufacturers.
134. See supra note 119. Theoretically, widespread dealer coercion could also be re-
flective of a desire on the part of a number of dealers to free ride (scenario #3). As a
practical matter, however, this is not likely. If the manufacturer-suggested vertical re-
straint is likely to increase sales, most dealers should welcome it. See supra note 118. It
will likely only be the occasional dealer who seeks to free ride. Indeed, successful free
riding requires that other dealers provide the full range of services. See supra note 61.
135. Widespread manufacturer coercion is harder to explain away. The likelihood that
(1) different manufacturers of different brands would receive similar requests for vertical
restraints from their dealers, and (2) coincidentally there be resistance from most manu-
facturers, and (3) that the resistance would in each case stem from an honest disagree-
ment over marketing strategy, is remote.
136. The consumer lawsuit may become increasingly important in the vertical restraint
area. Even assuming there is a manufacturer cartel, the dealer is limited in his lawsuit by
the fact that he cannot sue for a cut of the monopoly profits. See supra note 127. The
consumer, on the other hand, is injured to the full extent of the overcharge. See supra
1991] COERCION IN ANTITRUST
restraints, widespread coercion will be present because the party on the
non-cartelized level (be it the manufacturer or the dealer) will resist the
vertical restraint (scenario 4#4).137 Unlike a plaintiff-dealer, however, a
consumer will also have standing to sue in all cases where there was no
coercion because the cartelizing manufacturers bought off the dealers
(scenario #5).138 Even without widespread coercion of the dealers, the
consumer is still injured by paying more than a competitive price because
of the cartel.
Technically, a no-coercion, explicit-resale-price restraint, like that in
Dr. Miles, also remains a violation of the antitrust laws after Monsanto
and Sharp.13 9 Absent a cartel, however, it is hard to see how anyone,
dealer or consumer, will have standing to sue for such a "violation"-
because, absent a cartel, no one will be injured by that which makes this
arrangement a violation of the antitrust laws."4
Does the varying and inconclusive nature of coercion evidence mean
that it should be excluded? Not at all. Frequently a party uses evidence
that is insufficient by itself to prove a point.4' However, because coer-
note 7. Unlike a dealer-plaintiff, however, a consumer complaining of a manufacturer
cartel may be met with the argument that the consumer is an indirect purchaser from the
manufacturer and barred from suing under Illinois Brick. See Illinois Brick Co. v. Illi-
nois, 431 U.S. 720, 735 (1977). The consumer can avoid the Illinois Brick indirect-pur-
chaser bar by alleging that the dealer from whom the consumer bought was a co-
conspirator. See California v. Standard Oil Co., 691 F.2d 1335, 1342 (9th Cir. 1982),
cert denied, 464 U.S. 1068 (1984); New York v. Dairylea Coop. Inc., 570 F. Supp. 1213,
1215-16 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
137. See supra note 121 and accompanying text. In the case of an alleged manufac-
turer cartel and coerced dealers, the consumer may face a formidable Illinois Brick hur-
dle. To overcome the indirect-purchaser bar, the consumer will have to allege that the
dealers, although coerced, were nonetheless co-conspirators. See supra note 136. To the
extent that the dicta in Monsanto really mean that coerced compliance is not the
equivalent of an agreement, see supra note 92 and accompanying text, this may be
impossible.
138. A consumer would also have standing where the cartelizing dealers bought off
manufacturers. See scenario #4, supra note 117. In these instances, where the dealers
had been bought off or were themselves cartelizing, there would be no Illinois Brick bar to
the consumer's lawsuit, provided the dealers were named as co-conspirators. See supra
note 136.
139. If the holdings of Monsanto and Sharp are followed, the prototype illegal vertical
restraint case is the much-maligned Dr. Miles-where there was an explicit agreement on
specific resale prices. See Burns, supra note 39, at 31.
140. See supra notes 102-08 and accompanying text. Ironically, when Monsanto,
Sharp, and USA Petroleum are read together, the result is an antitrust "violation" (the
Dr. Miles situation, see supra note 139) for which no one has standing to sue. In addition,
the very showing of a cartel, satisfying the antitrust injury requirement of demonstrating
harm flowing from that which makes the arrangement illegal under the antitrust laws, is
likely to involve a coerced arrangement, not the agreed-upon restraint that Monsanto
calls for.
141. For instance, in a horizontal restraint case, the plaintiff may introduce evidence of
conscious parallelism to show an agreement. While proof of conscious parallelism is by
itself insufficient to show an agreement, see Theatre Enters. v. Paramount Distrib. Corp.,
346 U.S. 537, 541 (1954), that does not make evidence of conscious parallelism inadmissi-
ble. It merely means that to get his case to the jury, the plaintiff must show something in
addition to the evidence of conscious parallelism. See Michelman v. Clark-Schwebel Fi-
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cion evidence, particularly individual coercion evidence, can be consis-
tent with both efficient and inefficient restraints, certain preliminary
questions must be asked when a party seeks to introduce such evidence.
First, what party wants to use coercion evidence and against whom?
There are three basic possibilities: (i) a plaintiff-dealer wants to use coer-
cion evidence against a defendant-manufacturer;' 42 (ii) a plaintiff-con-
sumer wants to use coercion evidence against a defendant-manufacturer
and/or defendant-dealer; or (iii) a defendant-manufacturer wants to use
the absence of coercion against a plaintiff-dealer or a plaintiff-con-
sumer.143 Next, is the cartel one that allegedly (i) encountered resistance
from the dealers or (ii) bought off the dealers? The answers to these
questions indicate the type of coercion evidence that the court should
permit.
1. The Plaintiff-Dealer. Where there is a plaintiff-dealer alleging a
manufacturer cartel resisted by dealers (scenario #4), the plaintiff who
wants to use coercion evidence should be required to introduce evidence
of widespread dealer coercion. A court should not permit a showing of
only individual coercion evidence in this context. Rather, given the am-
biguous nature of individual coercion evidence, it should be allowed, if at
all, only where a plaintiff-dealer alleges a manufacturer cartel that
bought off other dealers but not the plaintiff herself (a modified scenario
#5). Even here, however, caution is warranted. This latter situation is
an unlikely occurrence,'" and individual coercion is equally consistent
with two, more likely, pro-competitive scenarios-scenarios #2 and #3.
Thus, a court may wish to condition the introduction of individual coer-
cion evidence upon a showing of some other evidence of a manufacturer
cartel.
ber Glass Corp., 534 F.2d 1036, 1043 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 885 (1976); Venzic
Corp. v. United States Mineral Prods. Co., 521 F.2d 1309, 1314 (3d Cir. 1975). Simi-
larly, in Monsanto, the Court held that evidence of dealer complaints by itself was not
sufficient to show a vertical agreement had been formed. The Court, however, specifically
noted that the complaints would be some evidence of such an agreement. See supra note
89.
142. Theoretically, there can also be the flip-side of this category-where a plaintiff-
manufacturer is seeking to use coercion against a defendant-dealer. Peter Cartensen and
Richard Dahlson suggest, for instance, that in the beer industry cartelizing wholesalers
may pressure manufacturers into using territorial restraints, which help the wholesalers
maintain their cartel. See Cartensen & Dahlson, Vertical Restraints in Beer Distribution:
A Study of the Business Justifications for and Legal Analysis of Restricting Competition,
1987 Wisc. L. Rev. 1, 20, 41-54. As a practical matter, however, most vertical restraint
cases are brought by dealers or by consumers (or states acting on behalf of their consumer
citizens). Furthermore, the evidentiary requirement for the plaintiff-manufacturer will be
the same as for a plaintiff-dealer.
143. Critics of the use of state of mind evidence often suggest that such evidence may
be misapplied by the jury to the detriment of the defendant. See supra note 110 and
accompanying text. Under current law, however, the defendant may well want to use the
absence of coercion as evidence of a pro-competitive restraint. See infra notes 221-38 and
accompanying text (regarding use of such evidence by defendant-manufacturer in tying
case).
144. See supra note 131.
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2. The Plaintiff-Consumer. Where a plaintiff-consumer is alleging a
manufacturer cartel that was resisted by the dealers (scenario #4), the
consumer wishing to use coercion evidence is in the same position as a
plaintiff-dealer and should be required to offer evidence of widespread
dealer coercion. 14 Here again, evidence of isolated instances of coercion
does not distinguish between efficient and inefficient vertical restraints.
If, however, the consumer is alleging that the cartelizing manufacturer
bought off his dealers (scenario #5), the plaintiff needs no evidence of
coercion, individual or widespread. Nor, as explained below, should the
absence of coercion be available as a defense.
3. The Defendant-Manufacturer. A defendant-manufacturer may
well want to use the absence of coercion as some evidence of a pro-com-
petitive vertical restraint.1" In a suit brought by a plaintiff-dealer, a
showing by the manufacturer of widespread dealer agreement with the
vertical restraint is significant evidence that the restraint is within scena-
rios #1, #2, or #3 and, therefore, economically efficient and not sub-
ject to attack under the Sherman Act. Furthermore, evidence of
widespread agreement tends to refute the plaintiff-dealer's allegation of a
manufacturer cartel within scenario #4. In the event that the manufac-
turer is faced with a charge of participating in a cartel that bought off
dealers (scenario #5), moreover, the manufacturer can use evidence of
the individual plaintiff-dealer's agreement and lack of resistance to show
an absence of standing.
In a suit brought by a plaintiff-consumer, the manufacturer's right to
use evidence of dealer agreement will depend on whether the consumer is
alleging a cartel that dealers resisted (scenario #4) or a cartel that
bought off dealers (scenario #5). In the former case, a showing by the
manufacturer of widespread dealer agreement is directly relevant to the
issue of whether a cartel existed. In the latter case, however, evidence of
dealer agreement, whether widespread or not, is irrelevant to the exist-
ence of the antitrust offense and to the consumer's standing and, there-
fore, should be precluded.
Thus, the adoption of the economic efficiency approach to vertical re-
straints has not eliminated coercion from the analysis of these arrange-
ments; it has simply changed the role that coercion plays. Coercion, and,
more specifically, widespread coercion, is now relevant as some evidence
of a manufacturer's or a dealer's use of a vertical restraint to facilitate a
cartel. Conversely, the presence of widespread agreement-or lack of
coercion-is indicative of a pro-competitive vertical restraint and poten-
tially important evidence for a defendant-manufacturer. That such evi-
dence will not alone prove or disprove the plaintiff's case (and in some
consumer cases may be wholly irrelevant) does not mean that the evi-
dence should be ignored altogether. With careful scrutiny from the trial
145. The plaintiff-consumer alleging a manufacturer cartel will also have to overcome
the Illinois Brick indirect-purchaser bar. See supra notes 136-37.
146. See supra note 125.
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court regarding the type of coercion or agreement evidence permitted,
and with appropriate jury instructions,1 47 this evidence is directly rele-
vant to the central question: Is this an economically efficient vertical
restraint?
IV. THE ROLE OF COERCION IN THE EARLY TYING CASES
(THE LAW BEFORE JEFFERSON PARISH)
The second major area in which coercion has a new role is in tying
analysis. 141 In the early tying cases, as with vertical pricing, territory,
and customer restraints, coercion was present in the rationale for con-
demning certain tie-ins, in determining the agreement element, and in the
in pari delicto defense.
In its early decisions,' 49 the Supreme Court quickly displayed a vis-
ceral dislike of almost all tying arrangements. A tie-in, the Court an-
nounced on more than one occasion, "serves hardly any purpose beyond
suppression of competition."' 5 ° The primary rationale for condemning
tie-ins in these early cases was the leverage theory, which asserted that a
seller with market power 151 in one product (the tying product) could use
a tying arrangement to acquire market power in a second, usually com-
plementary product (the tied product). 52 The evil of such a tie-in was
147. A jury will, for instance, have to be instructed that a showing by a plaintiff-dealer
or plaintiff-consumer of widespread dealer coercion is not, by itself, proof that there was a
manufacturer cartel.
148. In simple terms, tying is the conditioning of the purchase of one commodity on
the purchase of another. See Nothern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958).
149. For a historical review of the tying cases, see Kramer, The Supreme Court and
Tying Arrangements: Antitrust as History, 69 Minn. L. Rev. 1013 (1985).
150. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305-06 (1949). The Court has
reaffirmed its position in subsequent cases. See Fortner Enters. v. United States Steel
Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 498 (1969) ("Fortner I"); United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38,
44 (1962); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958); Times-Picayune
Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 605 (1953). The Court in Fortner I added:
"[T]ying arrangements generally serve no legitimate business purpose that cannot be
achieved in some less restrictive way." Fortner I, 394 U.S. at 503.
151. How much market power was necessary in the tying market was not altogether
clear in the early cases. In Times-Picayune, the Court suggested that monopoly power or
at least "market dominance" was necessary. See Times-Picayune, 345 U.S. at 611. In
subsequent cases, however, the Court diluted the market power requirement. In North-
ern Pacific, "sufficient economic power" was said to be enough, see Northern Pacific, 356
U.S. at 6; in Fortner I, the Court stated that a seller's "unique economic advantage"
sufficed, see Fortner 1, 394 U.S. at 505. Additionally, in the early cases, the Court held
that market power in the tying market could be inferred from the product's distinctive or
unique attributes. See, e.g., Loew's, 371 U.S. at 45 (copyrighted films as tying products);
Northern Pacific, 356 U.S. at 7-8 (land as tying product); International Salt Co. v. United
States, 332 U.S. 392, 395 (1947) (patented product as tying product).
152. See, e.g., Loew's, 371 U.S. at 45 ("A tie-in contract may have ... undesirable
effects when the seller, by virtue of his position in the market for the tying product, has
economic leverage sufficient to induce his customers to take the tied product along with
the tying item."); Northern Pacific, 356 U.S. at 11 ("the vice of tying arrangements lies in
the use of economic power in one market to restrict competition on the merits in an-
other"); Times-Picayune, 345 U.S. at 611 ("the essence of illegality in tying agreements is
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said to be twofold. First, it injured the buyer of the tied package by
eliminating his freedom to buy whatever product he wanted in the tied
market."5 3 Second, it harmed "competition on the merits" in the tied
market. 154 While never precisely defined, this second injury focused on
the disruption of the tied market" 5 and particularly on the foreclosure of
rival competitors in the tied market, who could no longer sell to the buy-
ers who bought the tied package.15 6
the wielding of monopolistic leverage; a seller exploits his dominant position in one mar-
ket to expand his empire into the next").
153. See, e.g., Northern Pacific, 356 U.S. at 6 ("buyers are forced to forego their free
choice between competing products"); Fortner I, 394 U.S. at 512 ("[The] distortion [pro-
duced by tying] injures the buyers of the [tied] product, who because of their preference
for the seller's brand of the [tying product,] are artificially forced to make a less than
optimal choice in the second.") (White, J., dissenting).
154. See, e.g., Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958) ("competition
on the merits with respect to the tied product is inevitably curbed"); see also United
States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 44-45 (1962) ("[Tie-ins] are an object of antitrust
concern for two reasons-they may force buyers into giving up the purchase of substi-
tutes for the tied product.., and they may destroy the free access of competing suppliers
of tied product to the consuming market." (citation omitted)); Times-Picayune Publish-
ing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 605 (1953) ("By conditioning his sale of one
commodity on the purchase of another, a seller coerces the abdication of buyers' in-
dependent judgment as to the 'tied' product's merits and insulates it from the competitive
stress of the open market.").
155. Kenneth Dam characterizes the Court's concern with "competition on the mer-
its" and "disruption" of the tied market as an atomistic view of competition. The atomis-
tic view, Dam explains, "is that competition is distorted if each product does not have its
price." Dam, Fortner Enterprises v. United States SteeL" "Neither A Borrower Nor A
Lender Be," 1969 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 30; see also Pearson, Tying Arrangements and Antitrust
Policy, 60 Nw. U.L. Rev. 626, 636 (1965) (questioning whether having each product
"compete on its own merit" is desirable or possible, and, if so, whether it should be
concern of antitrust laws). The Court's use of such an atomistic philosophy is perhaps
best seen in United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) ("The prac-
tice [of block booking movies] tends to equalize rather than differentiate the reward for
the individual copyrights.... Each stands not on its own footing but in whole or in part
on the appeal which another film may have.").
156. The Court's concern for rivals in the tied market runs throughout the early cases.
In International Salt, for instance, the Court spoke of the tie-in as "clos[ing] this market
for [the tied product] against competition," and concluded that it is "unreasonable, per se,
to foreclose competitors from any substantial market." International Salt Co. v. United
States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947); see also Northern Pacific, 356 U.S. at 6, 8 ("[Tie-ins]
deny competitors free access to the market for the tied product, not because the party
imposing the tying requirements has a better product or a lower price but because of his
power or leverage in another market." The tying firm's "purpose obviously was to fence
out competitors, to stifle competition."); Times-Picayune, 345 U.S. at 605 ("[T]he effect
[of a tie-in] on competing sellers attempting to rival the 'tied' product is drastic: to the
extent the enforcer of the tying arrangement enjoys market control, other existing or
potential sellers are foreclosed from offering up their goods to a free competitive judg-
ment; they are effectively excluded from the marketplace."); United States v. Griffith, 334
U.S. 100, 107 (1948) ("[T]he use of monopoly power, however lawfully acquired to fore-
close competition, to gain a competitive advantage, or to destroy a competitor, is unlaw-
ful."); Fortner Enters. v. United States, 394 U.S. 495, 509 (1969) ("Fortner I") ("[Tie-ins]
crippl[e] other companies that are equally, if not more, efficient in producing their own
products.") Even Justice White in his dissent in Fortner I agreed that "tying forecloses
other sellers of the tied product and makes it more difficult for new firms to enter the
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Coercion played a significant, albeit somewhat unsteady, role under
this view of tying arrangements. To the extent that the Court empha-
sized buyer freedom, coercion was central to the very rationale for con-
demning the activity, just as it had been a key part of the rationale for
condemning vertical price, territory, or customer restraints.15 7 On the
other hand, to the extent that the Court stressed the potential harm to
competitors in the tied market, coercion of the buyer played a lesser role
in the rationale for condemning tying arrangements. In the latter in-
stance, there was no need to show that buyers actively resisted buying the
tied product from the defendant. Even if buyers were indifferent to being
required to buy the tied product from the defendant, competitors in the
tied market were nonetheless foreclosed from selling to those buyers.1 s
Furthermore, as with vertical pricing, territorial, and customer re-
straints, coercion was no bar to finding an agreement in a tying arrange-
ment.'59 Provided there was a completed sale or lease, 16° the Supreme
Court assumed without discussion that an "agreement" existed for pur-
poses of section 1 of the Sherman Act,16 ' even though that agreement
market." Fortner I, 394 U.S. at 513 (White, J., dissenting). Dam notes that, ironically, in
Fortner I the Court stressed the harm to rivals in the tied market as a justification for
condemning a tie-in, even though in that case the plaintiff was a buyer, not a rival. See
Dam, supra note 155, at 37.
157. Indeed, the Court suggested that a tie could be illegal even if only some buyers
were restrained by it. See Fortner I, 394 U.S. at 503 ("an appreciable restraint results
whenever the seller can exert some power over some of the buyers in the market, even if
his power is not complete over them and over all buyers in the market"). This concern
for some buyers can also be seen as a concern for foreclosure of even a small number of
rivals in the tied market. See Baker, The Supreme Court and the Per Se Tying Rule:
Cutting the Gordian Knot, 66 Va. L. Rev. 1235, 1244 (1980) [hereinafter Baker, The
Supreme Court].
158. See Fortner I, 394 U.S. at 512-13 (White, J., dissenting); Austin, supra note 50, at
1176; Turner, The Validity of Tying Arrangements Under the Antitrust Laws, 72 Harv. L.
Rev. 50, 60-61 (1958); Note, Tying Arrangements and the Individual Coercion Doctrine,
30 Vand. L. Rev. 755, 792 (1977).
159. See United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 40 (1962). A tying arrangement
can be challenged under either § 1 of the Sherman Act or § 3 of the Clayton Act. If the
challenge is brought under § 1, an agreement is necessary. See supra note 30. If suit is
brought under § 3, there must be a sale or lease. See 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1988). Because § 3
of the Clayton Act is limited to leases and sales of goods, many tying cases are brought
under § I of the Sherman Act or under both statutory provisions. Indeed, in his historical
analysis of the tying cases, Victor Kramer notes that most tie-ins reviewed by the
Supreme Court after International Salt in 1947 have involved tying claims under § 1 of
the Sherman Act. See Kramer, supra note 149, at 1037.
160. An attempted agreement is insufficient for § I of the Sherman Act, and an at-
tempted sale is typically insufficient for § 3 of the Clayton Act. See Famous Brands, Inc.
v. David Sherman Corp., 814 F.2d 517, 523-24 (8th Cir. 1987); Ron Tonkin Gran Tur-
ismo v. Fiat Distribs., 637 F.2d 1376, 1388-89 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 831
(1981); E.T. Barwick Indus. v. Walter E. Heller & Co., 692 F. Supp. 1331, 1338 (N.D.
Ga. 1987), aff'd, 891 F.2d 906 (11th Cir. 1989); VII P. Areeda, supra note 7, at 1460c.
A buyer may have standing to challenge a tie-in, however, where the buyer wanted to buy
the tying product without the tied product and other sales of the tying package occurred.
See Thompson v. Metropolitan Multi-List, Inc., 934 F.2d 1566, 1572 (11 th Cir. 1991).
161. See supra note 30. The Court's assumption that a completed sale was an "agree-
ment" for purposes of a tying allegation under § 1 was consistent with the Court's as-
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typically involved an unwilling, coerced buyer.' 62 Thus, as with vertical
restraints, the Court thrust the buyer in the tying case into the dual roles
of coerced victim and co-conspirator.
Insofar as the in pari delicto bar was concerned, coercion played ex-
actly the same role in tying cases that it played in the vertical restraint
cases.' 63 The Perma Life case itself, which set the bounds of the in pari
delicto defense, involved claims of tying as well as allegations of vertical
pricing and territorial restraints."6 The upshot was that by showing co-
ercion, a buyer in a tying case could escape the in par! delicto bar and be
a plaintiff/victim as well as a co-conspirator.16 5
sumption that an express agreement on resale prices satisfied the § 1 agreement element
in a vertical price fixing charge. See Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co.,
220 U.S. 373, 398 (1911). For a criticism of this assumption in Dr. Miles, see Burns,
supra note 39, at 16-17. The only case in which the Supreme Court touched specifically
on the issue of the agreement element in a tie-in case was Perma Life, a case involving
allegations of vertical pricing and territorial restrictions as well as tying allegations. See
supra note 44. In Perma Life, the Court noted: "[E]ach [franchise dealer] can clearly
charge a combination between [the franchisor] and himself, as of the day he unwillingly
complied with the restrictive franchise agreements." Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. Inter-
national Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 142 (1968).
162. Although tying involves a sales or lease agreement between the tying seller and
the buyer, the Supreme Court assumed, in many of its cases, that the buyer had the tied
sale thrust upon him. Whether finding a "coerced sale" under § 3 of the Clayton Act or a
"coerced agreement" under § 1 of the Sherman Act, the Court implicitely recognized
that tying is actually an exertion of unilateral seller power. See supra note 153; VII P.
Areeda, supra note 7, at 1441h. However, while coercion was not a barrier to finding
an agreement in a tying arrangement, coercion was not used in tying, as it had been with
other vertical restraints, to prove the existence of the agreement. See supra notes 39-40.
In the tying arrangement, the completed sale or lease provided an obvious "agreement."
163. Coercion played an additional role in the standing analysis in tying cases-it es-
tablished causation in fact on the part of a plaintiff buyer. Even assuming a seller is
illegally tying two products, a buyer who would have bought the tied product from the
defendant even without the tie lacks standing because he personally has not been injured
by the tie-in. See e.g., Murphy v. Business Cards of Tomorrow, Inc., 854 F.2d 1202,
1204 (9th Cir. 1988) (franchisee's tying claim fails when unable to show that they or
other franchisees did not voluntarily buy equipment from franchisor); Ungar v. Dunkin'
Donuts of Am., Inc., 531 F.2d 1211, 1219-24 (3d Cir. 1976) (plaintiff-buyer in tying case
must show he did not accept tied product voluntarily). Coercion can thus be used as a
tool to eliminate those persons who would freely buy the tied product from the defendant
with or without the tying arrangement. See Hovenkamp, Tying Arrangements and Class
Actions, 36 Vand. L. Rev. 213, 226 (1983) [hereinafter Hovenkamp, Tying Arrangements].
Arthur Austin suggests that courts use coercion in this sense to avoid giving a "windfall"
to an "undeserving" plaintiff. See Austin, supra note 50, at 1152. Some commentators
argue that the state of mind of the buyer ought not be considered; once the plaintiff/buyer
shows power in the tying market, coercion should be assumed. See id. at 1168; Note,
supra note 158, at 784-85.
164. See supra notes 41-50 and accompanying text.
165. In tying cases, it is especially important that a plaintiff-buyer be able to be both a
victim and a co-conspirator. Unlike the dealer faced with vertical resale price mainte-
nance, a buyer in a tying arrangement cannot generally rely on the defendant's sales to
other buyers to establish the necessary agreement. "That rival dealers... patronize rival
suppliers does not ordinarily interfere with the ability of competing dealers to... refrain
from dealing with other suppliers." VII P. Areeda, supra note 7, ' 1460e, at 211.
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V. THE ROLE OF COERCION UNDER CURRENT TYING ANALYSIS
Just as they do in analyzing vertical restraints, proponents of the eco-
nomic efficiency approach dispense with coercion as a rationale for con-
demning tie-ins. 166 Instead, they begin with the premise that a tying
arrangement should be objectionable from an antitrust standpoint only
when it results in an increase in prices or a reduction in output in the tied
market or is otherwise economically inefficient.167 Absent such a monop-
olistic effect in the tied market (or other economic inefficiency), 168 a tie is
economically unobjectionable, regardless of any coercion of the buyer or
exclusion of rival sellers from the tied market.' 6 9 Furthermore, contrary
to the Supreme Court's early suspicion of almost all ties, the economic
efficiency advocates argue that only rarely will a tie have such an eco-
nomically harmful effect. In particular, they contend that the leverage
theory is an inadequate explanation of why a seller would use a tie-in and
166. The concept of coercion, they note, has been the source of much confusion in
tying law. See, e.g., H. Hovenkamp, Economics, supra note 4, § 8.10, at 237 (coercion
has become "a bugbear in tie-in analysis" and has been used by courts to mean four
different things); Baker, The Supreme Court, supra note 157, at 1274, 1317-18 ("history
of the coercion requirement is one of confusion and tortured distinctions"; coercion in the
sense of buyer freedom should be eliminated from tying analysis just as it was dismissed
in Sylvania from analysis of vertical territorial and customer restraints); Pearson, supra
note 155, at 632 ("Of all the claims of alleged evils of tying arrangements, [buyer coer-
cion] has the least merit, for the charge is really nothing more than that the seller has
made the best deal he can.").
167. See Baker, The Supreme Court, supra note 157, at 1268; Markovits, Tie-Ins and
Reciprocity: A Functional, Legal, and Policy Analysis, 58 Tex. L. Rev. 1363, 1429-44
(1980). Some commentators argue that even a tie that enables the seller to gain a monop-
oly in the tied market is not necessarily anti-competitive because the tying seller's success
in the tied market may result from his providing the buyers with a package they want.
Rather than condemn such conduct, these commentators argue, the law should en-
courage firms to compete in meeting consumer demands. See Jones, The Two Faces of
Fortner: Comment On A Recent Antitrust Opinion, 78 Colum. L. Rev. 39, 45-47 (1978).
168. See infra note 178.
169. Just as coercion of the buyer is, by itself, an economically insufficient basis for
condemning a tie, so too, the economic efficiency proponents argue, exclusion of rivals in
the tied market, in and of itself, is not necessarily inefficient. The tying seller may be
excluding rivals because he is offering the consumer a desirable package at a desirable
price. See Baker, The Supreme Court, supra note 157, at 1267-68; Jones, supra note 167,
at 45-47; Pearson, supra note 155, at 635-38; Posner, Exclusionary Practices and the Anti-
trust Laws, 41 U. Chi. L. Rev. 506, 509 (1974). On the other hand, some critics of the
economic efficiency approach argue that buyer coercion should continue to be an in-
dependent basis for condemning a tying arrangement. See, e.g., Bauer, A Simplified Ap-
proach to Tying Arrangements: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 33 Vand. L. Rev. 283,
288-91 (1980) ("coercion of the buyer ... should be enough to satisfy the injury require-
ment of a tying arrangement"); Slawson, supra note 7, at 264-65 ("tie-ins reduce competi-
tion by limiting buyer options"). Additionally, other critics contend that the economic
efficiency proponents fail to give adequate weight to the harm that tying arrangements
can do to rivals in the tied market. See, e.g., Slawson, supra note 7, at 266-69 (rivals are
harmed because entry barriers are raised and competition is reduced); Strasser, An Anti-
trust Policy for Tying Arrangements, 34 Emory L.J. 253, 283-84 (1985) ("these arrange-
ments can interfere with the populist goal of preserving individual entrepreneurial
opportunity").
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an improper basis for condemning most ties. 7 ' They argue that there
are other, more likely reasons that a seller might use a tying arrangement
and that these wholly or partially pro-competitive uses of tie-ins were
either overlooked or given insufficient weight in the early Supreme Court
decisions. A seller might, for instance, be using a tie-in as a way of safe-
guarding the goodwill or quality of the tying product.' 7 1 Or, there may
be economies of scale achieved by the joint production or joint sale of the
two products, with the resulting cost of the package being lower than the
cost of the component parts. 172 Or, the seller may just be offering the
170. Economic efficiency advocates point out that unless the tying seller has monopoly
power in the tying market, buyers who do not want both products will simply turn to
another seller. Moreover, even a seller with monopoly power in the tying market will
typically be unable to create a new monopoly in the tied market; rather, buyers will
simply regard the tie-in as the effective equivalent of a price increase for the tying product
and the monopolist's sales in the tying product will decline as they would with any price
increase. See R. Posner, Antitrust Law, supra note 2, at 173-74; Bowman, Tying Ar-
rangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 Yale L.J. 19, 20-27 (1957); Markovits, Tie-ins,
Reciprocity, and the Leverage Theory Part II: Tie-ins, Leverage, and the American Anti-
trust Laws, 80 Yale L.J. 195, 197-205 (1970). Indeed, some commentators argue that
without market power, a seller cannot use a tying arrangement in an economically ineffi-
cient, and therefore objectionable, way. See, eg., H. Hovenkamp, Economics, supra note
4, § 8.3, at 219 ("A forced package sale by a seller without market power must be efi-
ciency creating or else the seller could not successfully sell its product this way.");
Goldberg, supra note 62, at 751-55 (manufacturer without market power may use tie-in
of products as just one of number of means of negotiating with dealer over shelf space and
display of "representative" line of manufacturer's product). Some critics of the economic
efficiency approach, on the other hand, would condemn certain tie-ins even when the
tying seller does not have market power in the tying market. See, e.g., Craswell, Tying
Requirements in Competitive Markets The Consumer Protection Issues, 62 B.U.L Rev.
661, 671-81 (1982) (suggesting that some tying arrangements where seller lacks market
power be handled as consumer protection issues); Slawson, supra note 7, at 259 (stating
that all tie-ins decrease competition).
171. See Bowman, supra note 170, at 29; see also Sidak, Debunking Predatory Innova-
tion, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1121, 1136-37 (1983) (noting that seller's interest in safeguarding
quality control is especially important when buyer has limited understanding of the tied
product or when seller is facing potential product liability expense). In International
Business Machines Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936), the Supreme Court rec-
ognized the possibility of a goodwill or quality control defense. The Court suggested,
however, that such a defense would be available only if the tie-in was the least restrictive
means of achieving such quality control. See id. at 139-40. Several commentators have
criticized the Court's least-restrictive-alternative requirement on the ground that it fails
to take into account the cost and efficiency of alternatives. Often, tying may be the least
costly method of guaranteeing goodwill or quality, and disallowing tying may therefore
result in higher prices for the consumer. See R. Posner, Antitrust Law, supra note 2, at
175; Baker, The Supreme Court, supra note 157, at 1250-51; Klein & Saft, The Law and
Economics of Franchise Tying Contracts, 28 J.L. & Econ. 345, 352-54 (1985); Sidak,
supra, at 1137-40.
172. See H. Hovenkamp, Economics, supra note 4, § 8.9, at 233-35; R. Posner, Anti-
trust Law, supra note 2, at 180-81; Bowman, supra note 170, at 29. Some courts address
this concern by finding a cost-cutting package to be "one product." See H. Hovenkamp,
supra note 4, § 8.9, at 233-35; E. Sullivan & J. Harrison, supra note 122, § 5.02, at 198-
202. On the other hand, some critics of the economic efficiency approach question
whether tie-ins are essential for the achievement of economies of scale. See, e.g., Strasser.
supra note 169, at 262-65 (argument that tie-ins create economies is less persuasive, econ-
omies ultimately result from increased sales of tied goods).
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consumer another choice through the tie.' 73 Economic efficiency propo-
nents argue that in such situations the law ought not sacrifice the inter-
ests of buyers in order to protect lazy rivals in the tied market.'
74
Rather, competitors faced with such tie-ins should be spurred on to
compete. 75
The economic efficiency advocates concede that there are other, super-
ficially less honorable reasons why a seller might be using a tie-in. The
seller might, they readily admit, be using a tying arrangement for price
discrimination, metering, or evasion of price controls. 76 This does not
mean, however, that all such ties-ins are inefficient. 177 Under certain cir-
cumstances, even some of these tying arrangements can be pro-competi-
tive. 1 78 The seller using a metering tie, for instance, may buy the tied
173. The economic efficiency proponents argue that rather than restricting the buyer's
choices, a tying arrangement actually increases the choices by letting the buyer choose a
package if he so desires. See Will v. Comprehensive Accounting Corp., 776 F.2d 665,
673-74 (7th Cir. 1985) (opinion by Judge Frank Easterbrook), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1129
(1986); Foremost Pro Color, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 703 F.2d 534, 542 (9th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1038 (1984); Jones, supra note 167, at 44-45; Pearson, supra
note 155, at 635-37.
174. A number of commentators have noted that the consumer's interest may be an
especially important reason for permitting tie-ins in the franchise area. In franchises, the
franchisor in effect provides the use of its brand name and a standardized product to the
franchisee dealer; it is just this standardization that the consumer is looking for when he
patronizes a franchise. A franchisee who does not depend on return business, however,
has a strong incentive to provide less-costly, lower-quality ingredients or services. Such a
franchisee, in effect, free rides on the majority of franchisees who observe the quality
controls. Such free riding harms not only the franchisor but also the consumer who is
misled and often pays full price for a product of lesser quality. The franchisor, faced with
such cheating franchisees, may find tying an easier and less costly way of avoiding the
free-riding franchisee than product specification and inspection. Disallowing tying will
only result in higher prices for consumers. See Baker, The Supreme Court, supra note
157, at 1277-78; Goldberg, supra note 62, at 746; Klein & Saft, supra note 171, at 349-53;
Mathewson & Winters, The Economics of Franchise Contracts, 28 J.L. & Econ. 503, 510
(1985).
175. See Jones, supra note 167, at 40-43 (competitors should be told: "Go ye and do
likewise!"). Some commentators also argue that tying may serve the pro-competitive pur-
pose of destabilizing a monopolistic market by introducing a new type of competition,
and tying may indeed be a sign that the market is moving from monopoly to competition.
See Baker, The Supreme Court, supra note 157, at 1272.
176. See H. Hovenkamp, Economics, supra note 4, §§ 8.6-8.8, at 226-33; Bowman,
supra note 170, at 21-29; Markovits, supra note 167, at 1378-1410.
177. The tie used for price discrimination, for example, enables the seller to extract
higher profits from his monopoly in the tying market; such a tie rarely forecloses rival
sellers in the tied market to the extent that the tying seller can raise prices and reduce
output in that market. See R. Posner, Antitrust Law, supra note 2, at 174-75; Bowman,
supra note 170, at 21-24; Markovits, supra note 167, at 1416-25; Sidak, supra note 171, at
1132-44. Similarly, while a price-control-evading tie may allow a seller to exploit his
existing monopoly in the tying market, the tie does not necessarily lead to the creation of
a new monopoly in the tied market. See Bowman, supra note 170, at 21-23. In some
instances, however, a seller may be able to gain a monopoly in the tied market through
such a tying arrangement. See H. Hovenkamp, Economics, supra note 4, § 8.6, at 226-27.
178. The economic efficiency proponents are not of one mind regarding the economic
efficiency of price discrimination ties. Some commentators argue that price discrimina-
tion is likely to result in a greater output in the tying product market and therefore the
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product from other firms in the tied market and thereby help these
firms;179 or, the seller may be using the metering tie as a way of offering
the buyer a different risk allocation."80 Even a price-control-evading tie
may be beneficial to the buyer if it is used to cut prices in a regulated
industry.18' What a court applying the antitrust laws must do, here
again, is distinguish between efficient restraints and inefficient ones.
Finally, the economic efficiency proponents argue that the same anti-
trust-standing analysis applied to mergers and vertical restraints must
also be applied in tying cases.' 82 In particular, only those plaintiffs-
whether buyers or rival sellers in the tied market-who can show they
have been injured by an anti-competitive effect of the tie should have
standing to sue.1 83
practice is actually economically efficient. See Sidak, supra note 171, at 1144. Others
contend that although price discrimination does not often lead to foreclosure in the tied
market, there is still an economic objection to it-increasing the gains of the monopolist
would encourage a firm to expend greater resources to obtain and keep a monopoly. See
R. Posner, Antitrust Law, supra note 2, at 177; Posner, The Chicago School, supra note
52, at 935. Saying this, however, does not mean that tying law is the proper vehicle for
regulating price discrimination. See R Posner, Antitrust Law, supra note 2, at 178-80.
Critics of the entire economic efficiency approach argue that the economic efficiency
theory fails to give sufficient weight to the societal harm flowing from a monopolist's use
of monopoly power, even where that use does not result in new monopoly power. See
Kaplow, Extension of Monopoly Power Through Leverage, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 515, 520-25
(1985); Strasser, supra note 169, at 274.
179. See R. Posner, Antitrust Law, supra note 2, at 175.
180. Metering may allow the buyer to pay less for the tying product that the buyer
may consider a risky investment.
[I]f the manufacturer is less averse to risk than his customers tie-ins can func-
tion as a risk-sharing device: the manufacturer of the new product system bears
the risk that the system will fail to meet the customer's needs and expectations;
if so, the dissatisfied customer can cut his losses by not buying any more of the
•.. tied product.
Sidak, supra note 171, at 1135; see also Austin, supra note 50, at 1171-72; Baker, The
Supreme Court, supra note 157, at 1280. The Department of Justice Vertical Restraint
Guidelines make the same point. See Antitrust Policies and Guidelines--Federal and
State, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,105, at 20,586-87 (Mar. 1, 1989). In addition, those
buyers who pay a lower total fee because of the price discrimination will benefit from
such a tie-in. See Hovenkamp, Tying Arrangements, supra note 163, at 244; Antitrust
Policies and Guidelines-Federal and State, supra, at 20,587.
181. See H. Hovenkamp, Economics, supra note 4, § 8.6, at 226-28; Markovits, supra
note 170, at 226-27.
182. The first step would be to determine what type of tie-in was being used-a price-
discrimination tie or a price-control-evading tie. Then, the plaintiff, whether a buyer or
rival in the tied market, would have to show that he was hurt by an economic inefficiency
of the tie. A buyer who paid a lesser price because of price discrimination, for instance,
would lack antitrust injury. See Hovenkamp, Tying Arrangements, supra note 163, at
224-27.
183. A buyer/plaintiff in a tying case would also have to show standing in the causa-
tion sense-that he did want to buy the tied product. See Hovenkamp, Tying Arrange-
ments, supra note 163, at 221-25. In this sense, even proponents of the economic
efficiency rationale agree that coercion has a role in tying analysis. See supra note 163.
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A. The Application of the Economic Efficiency Approach to Tying
In its most recent tying decision, Jefferson Parish Hospital District No.
2 v. Hyde,' 4 the Supreme Court went a substantial way toward adopting
an economic efficiency approach to tying analysis. Justice Stevens, writ-
ing for the Court's majority,'85 acknowledged that although some ties
may be anti-competitive, other ties will be pro-competitive.' 8 6 Further,
in accord with the economic efficiency approach, Justice Stevens stressed
that the evil of an illegal tie comes in its effect on competition in the tied
market 187 -in particular, its effect on price, quantity, or quality in that
market. 18  Coercive effect on the buyer alone, Justice Stevens specifically
noted, is not sufficient to prove an illegal tie.18 9
184. 466 U.S. 2 (1984). In Jefferson Parish, an anesthesiologist who was denied admis-
sion privileges sued the hospital and claimed that the hospital illegally tied the hospital's
operating rooms to the hospital's anesthesiological services. See generally Bern, Jefferson
Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde: Return to Reality in Economic Power Analysis in
Tying Cases, 53 UMKC L. Rev. 145 (1985) (analyzing opinion); Slawson, supra note 7
(same); see also Kramer, supra note 149, at 1049-63 (analyzing opinion and concurrence).
185. Five justices joined in the majority decision written by Justice Stevens; four jus-
tices joined in a concurring decision written by Justice O'Connor.
186. In particular, the Court noted that where a seller without market power in the
tying market uses a tie-in, the "seller's decision to offer such packages can merely be an
attempt to compete effectively" by offering the buyer an attractive package sale. See
Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 12.
187. The majority acknowledged that, in order for a tie-in to have an effect on the tied
market, the defendant must, at least in per se cases, have market power in the tying
market. See id. at 12-14. According to the majority opinion, such market power could
be shown through a patent which gave rise to a presumption of market power, through a
showing of a high market share, or through a demonstration that "the seller offers a
unique product that competitors are not able to offer." Id. at 17. In addition, the major-
ity was willing to consider, but rejected, "market imperfections" that might allow a seller
without a substantial market share nonetheless to exert market power. See id. at 27; see
also Klein & Saft, supra note 171, at 357 (arguing that Court correctly rejected "market
imperfection" theory given facts of Jefferson Parish).
The Court left open the possibility that a plaintiff could prove an illegal tie-in under the
rule of reason without proving the defendant seller had power in the tying market. In
such a case, the plaintiff could prevail only by showing an actual effect on competition in
the tied market. See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 17-18.
188. Echoing some economists' search for creation of "new" market power in the tied
market, see supra notes 165-67 and accompanying text, the Court noted that "the law
draws a distinction between the exploitation of market power by merely enhancing the
price of the tying product, on the one hand, and by attempting to impose restraints on
competition in the market for a tied product, on the other." Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at
14. In the second instance, the Sherman Act may be implicated because competition in
the tied market may be impaired. "This impairment could either harm existing competi-
tors or create barriers to entry of new competitors in the market for the tied product."
Id. Specifically, the Court indicated that it was looking for evidence that the price, qual-
ity, or supply of the tied product had been adversely affected by the tying arrangement in
question. See id. at 30 n.49.
Additionally, the Court noted that the effect on competition in the tied market must be
substantial. "If only a single purchaser were 'forced' with respect to the purchase of a
tied item, the resultant impact on competition would not be sufficient to warrant the
concern of antitrust law." Id. at 16.
189. As in earlier cases, the majority continued to regard the tying arrangement as
having two effects-an effect on rival sellers in the tied market and one on buyers who
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Although the majority of the Court in Jefferson Parish stopped short
of a wholehearted adoption of the economic efficiency approach to ty-
ing,' 9° the four concurring justices would have gone even further. 91 Jus-
tice O'Connor, who authored the concurring opinion, recommended that
tie-ins be analyzed under the rule of reason'92 and, in particular, that a
plaintiff be required to make a threshold showing of (1) market power in
the tying market;193 (2) two distinct products;194 and (3) "a substantial
purchase the tying package. See id. at 14-16. The Court's concern, however, was primar-
ily with the effect in the tied market. Thus, while the Court was willing to consider the
possibility of an illegal tie even though the buyers, because of ignorance or other market
imperfections, might not feel "forced" to take the tied product, the Court was not willing
to consider a tie illegal when the only effect was coercion of the buyer. "[V]hen a pur-
chaser is 'forced' to buy a product he would not have otherwise bought even from an-
other seller in the tied-product market, there can be no adverse impact on competition
because no portion of the market which would otherwise have been available to other
sellers has been foreclosed." Id. at 16.
While Justice Stevens' opinion is replete with talk of "forcing" of buyers, the context
indicates that he was using "forcing of buyers" as a short-hand way of referring to the
need to show the defendant had market power in the tying product. For instance, Justice
Stevens states:
Only if patients are forced to purchase [anesthesiological] services as a result of
the hospital's market power would the arrangement have anti-competitive con-
sequences.... The question remains whether this arrangement involves the use
of market power to force patients to buy services they would not otherwise
purchase.
Id at 25-26. The only reference that Justice Stevens makes to coercion of the buyer as an
evil in itself is in a quote from Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S.
594, 605 (1953) (quoted at 466 U.S. at 12-13).
190. The majority did adopt an economic approach to the question of whether one or
two products were presented. They noted: "[N]o tying arrangement can exist unless
there is a sufficient demand for the purchase of anesthesiological services separate from
hospital services to identify a distinct product market in which it is efficient to offer anes-
thesiological services separately from hospital services." Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No.
2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 21-22 (1984). The majority, however, was unwilling to dispense
with the per se label for tie-ins. "It is far too late in the history of our antitrust jurispru-
dence to question the proposition that certain tying arrangements pose an unacceptable
risk of stifling competition and therefore are unreasonable 'per se.'" Id. at 9. Addition-
ally, the majority continued to regard leverage as a realistic danger, see id. at 14, and it
continued to treat quality control as a defense that was subject to the least-restrictive-
alternative requirement. See id. at 26 n.42. Victor Kramer concludes that the majority
opinion returns tying law to its 1947 International Salt position. See Kramer, supra note
149, at 1049.
191. Victor Kramer asserts that the concurring justices would have returned tie-in law
to its status in United Shoe L See Kramer, supra note 149, at 1049.
192. Justice O'Connor noted that typically per se rules are applied without proof of
market power or anti-competitive effects but that tying cases, although designated per se,
involve just such "an elaborate inquiry into the economic effects of the tying arrange-
ment." Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 34 (O'Connor, J., concurring). At the same time,
tying analysis lost the advantage of a rule-of-reason approach-namely, consideration of
the economic benefits that the tie may have. See id. at 34-35 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Furthermore, use of the rule of reason would bring the analysis of tying arrangements in
line with the analysis of vertical non-price restraints which, Justice O'Connor asserted,
were "largely indistinguishable from tie-ins." Id. at 35 n.2 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
193. Justice O'Connor asserted that absent power in the tying-product market, "tying
cannot conceivably have any adverse impact in the tied-product market, and can be only
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threat that the tying seller will acquire market power in the tied-product
market." '95 If these showings were made, a court would then balance
the economic harms of the tying arrangement1 96 against the economic
benefits the agreement. 197 Such a careful analysis was necessary, accord-
ing to Justice O'Connor, because a tying arrangement potentially pro-
procompetitive in the tying-product market." Id. at 37 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Fur-
thermore, Justice O'Connor, unlike the majority, would not allow a presumption of mar-
ket power based on a patent or copyright, a unique product, or a high market share.
"While each of these three factors might help to give market power to a seller, it is also
possible that a seller in these situations will have no market power . . . ." Id. at 37 n.7
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
194. Justice O'Connor's test for two products differed from the majority's. While the
majority looked at "the character of the demand for the two items," id. at 19, Justice
O'Connor framed the question as whether the tied product is one that consumers might
wish to purchase separately from the tying product. See id. at 39 (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring). She argued that her test provided a more "coherent economic basis" for analysis
because "[w]hen the tied product has no use other than in conjunction with the tying
product, a seller of the tying product can acquire no additional market power by selling
the two products together." Id. at 39 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
195. Id. at 38 (O'Connor, J., concurring). A determination of illegality, Justice
O'Connor wrote, "should depend upon the demonstrated economic effects of the chal-
lenged agreement." Id. at 41 (O'Connor, J., concurring). No threat to the tied market
exists "if the tied-product market is occupied by many stable sellers who are not likely to
be driven out by the tying, or if entry barriers in the tied-product market are low." Id. at
38 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
196. Justice O'Connor saw two fundamental types of harm that could flow from a
tying arrangement. First, there could be "a demonstrable exclusionary impact in the
tied-product market," that is, "in the rare cases where power in the market for the tying
product is used to create additional market power in the market for the tied product."
Id. at 35-36 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Second, the tying arrangement could "abet the
harmful exercise of market power that the seller possesses in the tying product market."
Id. at 35 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor gave two examples of the latter
type of tie-in-ties used to evade price regulations in the tying market and ties used for
price discrimination. See id. at 36 n.4 (O'Connor, J., concurring). The majority of the
Court had similarly recognized that tying could be used to facilitate price discrimination,
"thereby increasing monopoly profits over what they would be absent the tie," id. at 15,
or "to evade price controls in the tying product." Id. at 28 n.47 (quoting Fortner Enters.
v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 513 (1969) (White, J., dissenting) ("Fortner
I,)).
197. Justice O'Connor quoted Justice White's statement in Fortner I describing the
potential pro-competitive uses of tie-ins:
[Tie-ins] may facilitate new entry into fields where established sellers have wed-
ded their customers to them by ties of habit and custom.... They may permit
clandestine price cutting in products which otherwise would have no price com-
petition at all because of fear of retaliation from the few other producers dealing
in the market. They may protect the reputation of the tying product if failure to
use the tied product in conjunction with it may cause it to misfunction. ...
And, if the tied and tying products are functionally related, they may reduce
costs through economies of joint production and distribution.
Id. at 41 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Fortner I, 394 U.S. at 514 n.9 (White, J.,
dissenting)). Some commentators criticize Justice O'Connor's balancing approach on the
ground that she fails to explain how this balancing of apples and oranges is to be done.
See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 149, at 1061 ("This balancing approach is analogous to
deciding whether a particular rose smells as sweet as a ... peach tastes and, therefore, .
leaves the rule of reason without any content.").
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duces "substantial" economic benefits"'8 and only in "rare cases" will it
be used to leverage power into a second market' 99 or produce other eco-
nomically harmful effects.' °°
Because a number of years have passed since the Supreme Court's de-
cision in Jefferson Parish,2"' one cannot be certain exactly how the Court
would analyze a tying case today.2" 2 In light of the Court's recent deci-
sions involving vertical restraints,2"3 however, a continued movement
toward an economically-based analysis is to be expected. More particu-
larly, in any future tying case, the Court will likely be looking for: ' (1)
evidence that will help it distinguish an inefficient tie-in--one that pro-
duces higher prices and restricted output in the tied market2 '5 or has
some other anti-competitive effect 2 6 -from an economically beneficial
tie;207 and (2) evidence showing that the plaintiff, whether a buyer or a
198. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 40 (1984) (O'Connor,
J., concurring).
199. See id at 36 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
200. See id at 36 n.4 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
201. During these seven years, two members of the majority in Jefferson Parish (Jus-
tices Brennan and Marshall) and two members who joined Justice O'Connor's concurring
opinion (Justices Burger and Powell) have left the Court. They have been replaced by
Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas.
202. The Court has recently granted certiorari in another tying case. See Image Tech-
nical Serv., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 903 F.2d 612 (9th Cir. 1990), cert granted, 111
S. Ct. 2823 (1991).
203. See supra Part III A.
204. This is obviously not an exhaustive list of the factors the Court might have to
consider in a future tying case. As in Jefferson Parish, the Court might have to determine
if two distinct products are being linked and if the tying seller has power in the tying
market.
205. How much effect must be shown in the tied market depends upon how far down
the economic efficiency road the Court goes. Justice Stevens in the majority opinion in
Jefferson Parish suggested a "substantial" volume of commerce must be affected in the
tied market. See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 16. Some advocates of the economic effi-
ciency approach seek, like Justice O'Connor in her concurring opinion, a showing that
there is a "substantial threat" that the tying seller will acquire market power in the tied
product market. See id. at 38 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also Parts & Elec. Motors,
Inc. v. Sterling Elec., Inc., 866 F.2d 228, 235 (7th Cir. 1988) ("plaintiff must show the
defendant has enough market power, present or prospective, in [the tied] market to make
the tie-in a threat to competition") (Posner, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 141
(1990); Will v. Comprehensive Accounting Corp., 776 F.2d 665, 674 (7th Cir. 1985)
(threshold requirement of substantial danger that tying seller would acquire market
power in tied-product market) (opinion by Judge Frank Easterbrook), cert. denied, 475
U.S. 1129 (1986).
206. Both the majority and concurring justices recognized that there can be harmful
effects from ties used for price discrimination or evasion of price controls, even though
these uses of tying arrangements will not always have a monopolistic effect in the tied
market. See supra note 196. Some economic efficiency proponents acknowledge that a
price-discrimination or price-control-evading tying arrangement can be inefficient even if
it does not result in new monopoly power in the tied market. See supra note 178.
207. This is not to say that a future Court will accept Justice O'Connor's suggestion
that the economic harms be balanced against any economic benefits. The Court may well
continue to consider economic benefits as a defense to a charge of illegal tying. What is
reasonably certain is that alleged economic benefits will be considered somewhere in the
tying analysis.
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rival in the tied market, has been injured by an anti-competitive aspect of
the tie.2°s
B. The New Role of Coercion in Tying
Assuming a continued adherence to an economic approach, the ration-
ale for condemning tying arrangements obviously will no longer be based
on coercion of the buyer alone. Just as trader freedom has been rejected
as a ground for condemning vertical price, territory, and customer re-
straints, so too the Court in Jefferson Parish made clear that buyers' free-
dom of choice will not be regarded as an adequate basis for striking down
a tying arrangement.20 9
Even in Jefferson Parish, however, the Supreme Court did not suggest
the wholesale eradication of coercion from tying analysis as it had with
vertical restraints. Some uses of coercion evidence arise from the nature
of the tie-in offense itself, and neither the Court nor proponents of the
economic efficiency approach have questioned the continued use of such
evidence. For example, coercion of buyers can be used to show linkage
of two products, 210 power in the tying product market, 21' or injury to a
208. Although the economic efficiency proponents look primarily to the effect on the
buyer or consumer to determine the economic efficiency of a restraint, see supra notes
167-75 and accompanying text, they have not suggested that rival sellers in the tied mar-
ket cannot in certain circumstances have standing to sue. Indeed, Jefferson Parish itself
involved a plaintiff who was a rival in the tied market, see Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist.
No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 5 (1984); and, in Blue Shield v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465
(1982), the Supreme Court specifically recognized that, in antitrust cases, there may be
more than one category of plaintiffs with standing to challenge a practice, see Blue Shield,
457 U.S. at 478-84. In the tying area, the rival seller's standing may be particularly
important where the consumer is unaware of the injury. See Key Enters. v. Venice
Hosp., 919 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990).
209. See supra note 189; accord Fox Motors, Inc. v. Mazda Distribs. (Gulf), Inc., 806
F.2d 953, 958 (10th Cir. 1986).
210. Absent a showing of linkage, there is, of course, no tie-in. "[W]here the buyer is
free to take either product by itself there is no tying problem even though the seller may
also offer the two items as a unit at a single price." Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States,
356 U.S. 1, 6 n.4 (1958). The most direct way to show linkage is through evidence of an
explicit contractual arrangement. When evidence of a contractual requirement is un-
available, however, a plaintiff (whether a buyer or rival) may seek to show linkage
through evidence of coercion. See Tic-X-Press, Inc. v. Omni Promotions Co., 815 F.2d
1407, 1415-16 (11th Cir. 1987); Foremost Pro Color, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 703
F.2d 534, 540-42 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1038 (1984); Austin, supra note
50, at 1156-68; Matheson, Class Action Tying Cases: A Framework for Certification Deci-
sions, 76 Nw. U.L. Rev. 855, 866-73 (1982). Because coercion is an individual issue with
each buyer, the use of such coercion evidence to show linkage frequently results in class
actions being unavailable. See Austin, supra note 50, at 1144-45; Hovenkamp, Tying
Arrangements, supra note 163, at 218; Matheson, supra.
211. See Northern Pacific, 356 U.S. at 6 ("where the seller has no control or dominance
over the tying product so that it does not represent an effectual weapon to pressure buyers
into taking the tied item any restraint.., would obviously be insignificant at most"). As
with linkage, market power in the tying market can be shown in ways other than through
evidence of coercion of buyers. A plaintiff can, for instance, put on evidence of the rele-
vant market and the defendant's market share to show market power, see, e.g., Times-
Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953) (market power shown
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plaintiff-buyer resulting from the tie-in.212
In addition, even assuming the ascendancy of the economic efficiency
approach (and despite the language of Monsanto2"'), the "agreement"
between the tying seller and the buyer will continue to be, in many cases,
a coerced one.214 To the extent the tying seller successfully uses the tie-in
to leverage into a position of market power in the tied market, the tie will
result in higher prices for the tied product,21 5 which the buyer obviously
will not willingly pay.216 Similarly, a buyer will object to a price-control-
through defendant's market share), or the plaintiff might be entitled to a presumption of
market power because of the defendant's control of a patent or copyright, see, eg., United
States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45-46 (1962) (when tying product patented or copy-
righted, there is presumption of market power). Evidence of coercion of buyers is simply
another type of evidence of power in the tying product market. Cf H. Hovenkamp,
Economics, supra note 4, § 8.10, at 237-39 (noting that coercion is not identical with
market power in that seller could well have market power in tying market and not be
coercing anyone; for example, monopolist in shoe industry might "tie" left and right
shoes but this may well be tie that virtually all consumers want); Matheson, supra note
210, at 870-73 (coercion evidence is often used when other evidence of market power is
unavailable or rebutted). In Jefferson Parish, the Court's use of "forcing" was primarily
in the context of showing market power. See supra note 189.
Coercion can similarly be used to show market power in a boycott case where the
victim or tool is on a different commercial level from the boycotters. See FTC v. Superior
Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411, 451 (1990) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
212. See supra note 163.
213. See supra notes 84-92 and accompanying text.
214. In the tying area, a number of lower courts have implicitly recognized that Mon-
santo is wrong and have taken the position that Monsanto's requirement of a "common
plan" agreement cannot possibly apply to tying cases. See, e.g., Image Technical Serv.,
Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 903 F.2d 612, 619 (9th Cir. 1990) (application of Monsanto
agreement test would place all tying arrangements beyond reach of Sherman Act), cert.
granted, 111 S. Ct. 2823 (1991); Will v. Comprehensive Accounting Corp., 776 F.2d 665,
669-70 (7th Cir. 1985) (coerced buyer of tied product can be plaintiff in tying case; this
holding of Perma life survives Monsanto, which has "nothing to say about the meaning of
the joint action requirement in a tying case") (opinion by Judge Frank Easterbrook), cert.
denied, 475 U.S. 1129 (1986); Black Gold, Ltd. v. Rockwool Indus., 732 F.2d 779, 780
(10th Cir.) (Monsanto does not retreat from those cases holding that agreement may be
found in tying case when buyer acquiesced because of danger of termination), cert. de-
nied, 469 U.S. 854 (1984). Contra Famous Brands, Inc. v. David Sherman Corp., 814
F.2d 517, 523 (8th Cir. 1987) (requiring Monsanto showing of conscious commitment to
common scheme). The only way to avoid the "coerced agreement" paradox in tying
cases is to consider tying as a unilateral action of a monopolist subject to antitrust attack
under § 2 of the Sherman Act, if at all. Even Richard Posner acknowledges that given
the legislative history of § 3 of the Clayton Act, this is an unlikely development. See R.
Posner, Antitrust Law, supra note 2, at 182-83.
215. The purpose of leveraging into a position of market power in the tied market is to
enable the seller, as a monopolist in this second market, to raise prices and obtain a
supracompetitive profit.
216. The buyer faced with a leveraging tie is in the same position as a buyer faced with
horizontally-fixed prices. In one sense, the buyer willingly pays the higher price in that
the buyer could always walk away from the product altogether. See Grappone. Inc. v.
Subaru of New England, Inc., 858 F.2d 792, 795 (1st Cir. 1988); Austin, supra note 50, at
1176-77; Slawson, supra note 7, at 270-75. In another sense, no buyer willingly pays
more than the competitive price for the product; instead the buyer pays the monopoly
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evading tie that is used to exact a higher price for the tying product.21 7
Additionally, the buyer who is required to pay more than other buyers
because of a price-discrimination tie will not have a "common plan" or
"unity of purpose" with the tying seller.21 8
Furthermore, as with vertical restraints, the ascendancy of the eco-
nomic efficiency approach in some ways increases the evidentiary roles
for coercion. Once again, coercion evidence-whether offered in the
plaintiff's case in chief or by the defense2 19-can assist the trier of fact in
sorting out good (economically efficient) ties from bad (economically
inefficient) ones. Further, here too this evidence may have a direct bear-
ing on whether the particular plaintiff has standing in the form of anti-
trust injury to challenge the restraint.
As with vertical restraints, the most useful coercion evidence will be
evidence of widespread buyer coercion or widespread buyer agreement.
This evidence will be directly relevant to whether a tying arrangement is
economically efficient and, consequently, whether anyone has antitrust
injury standing to challenge it. For instance, where a defendant claims
that his tying arrangement is economically efficient in producing econo-
mies of production or distribution, or in otherwise offering a desirable
package to buyers, 220 a key question will be whether most buyers did in
fact want this package.2 21 To the extent the defendant can show that the
majority of buyers did want the package and were not coerced into tak-
ing it,222 the defendant has shown some (although not necessarily conclu-
price only because the seller is the only show in town. Cf. supra note 7 (buyer unwilling
to pay higher prices will switch to substitutes).
217. Buyers faced with a price-control-evading tie that increases prices are also in a
position analogous to that of buyers faced with a horizontally-fixed price. No buyer
wants to pay a price higher than the controlled price for the tying product. If the price-
control-evading tie is used to cut prices, however, buyers will be pleased with the tying
arrangement. See infra note 231.
218. Buyers who pay less because of a price discrimination tie will, however, be pleased
with the tying arrangement. See infra note 236 and accompanying text.
219. After Jefferson Parish it is not clear whether evidence of a tying arrangement's
economically beneficial results will be addressed in the plaintiff's case in chief or by way
of a defense. The majority suggested that arguments that ties were used for goodwill and
quality control would be defenses. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466
U.S. 2, 26 n.42 (1984). The concurring justices, on the other hand, suggested that any
pro-competitive aspects of the tying arrangement should be considered in the plaintiff's
case in chief. See id. at 41.
220. Buyers may find the package attractive for reasons other than low cost. There
may, for instance, be what some call efficiencies in product selection. That is, the buyer
may prefer the package over the component parts because the buyer prefers having the
seller, who possesses greater expertise, select the tied product. See Craswell, supra note
170, at 681-82.
221. An economically efficient tie-in is one that is beneficial to most consumers. There
may be some buyers who do not want left and right shoes in packages, but a seller will
often be able to achieve economies of scale by using a tie-in for all sales. See H.
Hovenkamp, Economics, supra note 4, § 8.2, at 216.
222. This is not to say that evidence of widespread consumer desire for the package is
the only method of showing an economies-of-scale tying arrangement. A defendant
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sive) evidence of an economically efficient tie.3 Moreover, even though
rival sellers in the tied market may have been harmed by such a tying
arrangement (in that it drew sales away from them) and some buyers
may be unhappy, neither the rivals nor the buyers will have standing in
the sense of antitrust injury to challenge the tying arrangement.2 4 On
the other hand, to the extent the plaintiff, whether a rival seller or buyer,
shows widespread coercion of buyers, suspicion is cast on any economies-
of-scale assertion.225
Similarly, evidence of widespread buyer coercion will be relevant to a
tying seller's contention that the tie is necessary to maintain the quality,
integrity, or goodwill of the tying product. 6 Here again, one expects
that if the defendant's claim is true and the tied product does indeed
provide a technological or other advantage in the use of the tying prod-
uct, then knowledgeable buyers as a group will want the tied product.?7
Buyers as a whole will likely object, however, if the seller's goodwill or
technological reason is invalid-that is, if use of the tied product does not
enhance use of the tying product in a way superior to alternatives." So
could, of course, also offer evidence of cost and price reduction. See R. Posner, Antitrust
Law, supra note 2, at 181.
223. See Bowman, supra note 170, at 29. Evidence of an absence of buyer coercion will
not necessarily be conclusive proof of an economies-of-scale benefit of the tie-in. Buyers
may, because of market imperfections, be ignorant of the higher price or poorer quality of
the tied product. See, eg., Key Enters. v. Venice Hosp., 919 F.2d 1550, 1557 (11th Cir.
1990) (consumers unable to assess lesser quality of tied product-home medical
equipment).
224. Neither the rival sellers nor the disgruntled buyer will have been injured because
of any economic inefficiency of the tie. To the contrary, each will be harmed by the
efficiency of the tie, by the fact that most consumers want the package and the defendant
is meeting that desire.
225. A showing of widespread buyer coercion may not always negate an economies-of-
scale defense. Theoretically, a tying seller could achieve economies of scale but not pass
the savings on to the buyers.
226. See supra note 171.
227. Indeed, both advocates and critics of the economic efficiency approach agree on
this point. See, eg., Bowman, supra note 170, at 28 (if buyer uses non-tied product of
sub-standard quality, "it might impair the operation or usefulness of the principal prod-
uct"); Strasser, supra note 169, at 262 ("when a buyer understands the interdependence,
he has a strong incentive to comply with the seller's technological specifications"). Here
too, however, evidence of willing buyers will not be conclusive evidence of an efficient tie-
in, because there is always the possibility of duped or uninformed buyers.
In addition, there is a temporal aspect that must be considered whenever a claim is
made that a tie is economically efficient because it serves a quality-control purpose. Buy-
ers may agree with the seller's quality-control claim when the tying product is first intro-
duced into the market and buyers are unfamiliar with its use. As buyers' sophistication
increases, however, their desire for the packaged sale may lessen. Thus, in judging buy-
ers' wishes, historical preferences may be of limited usefulness.
228. A distinction has to be drawn between tying arrangements where the consumer is
the direct buyer and those in which a franchisee is the direct buyer from the tying seller.
In the franchise situation, a franchisee may want to avoid a valid quality-control tie in
order to cut costs and free ride on the quality image maintained by the other franchisees.
See supra note 174. Even here, however, the free-riding franchisee wants the other fran-
chisees to continue to buy the tied product or service. Only if most franchisees do so will
the public continue to see the franchise as a quality image. The free-riding franchisee is
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too, where a metering tie is claimed to be pro-competitive in providing a
form of risk allocation for buyers,229 the question arises as to whether
there is widespread buyer support for this tying arrangement (which
tends to support the claim that the tie is economically efficient in provid-
ing the buyers a desirable risk-allocation package),230 or whether there is
widespread buyer opposition to the tie (in which case the risk-allocation
claim is less likely valid).231  Additionally, in each of these cases, if the
evidence indicates there is an economically efficient tie, rival sellers, and
any disgruntled buyers, will lack standing to challenge it.23 2
Evidence of individual coercion or individual agreement will also be
relevant in some tying cases. Unlike widespread coercion, evidence of
individual coercion will not be helpful in sorting out efficient from ineffi-
cient ties; it will, however, be relevant in determining a plaintiff-buyer's
standing in some cases in which the buyer successfully shows an ineffi-
cient tie.233 While all buyers suffer antitrust injury when there is a tie-in
used successfully by the tying seller to leverage himself into a position of
power in the tied market,234 price-discrimination ties do not necessarily
thus in a position analogous to the firm that has joined a horizontal cartel but now wishes
to cheat on that cartel. Cheating only works if the other firms maintain the higher price.
See supra note 12.
229. While there is some debate even among proponents of the economic efficiency
approach about price discrimination and metering ties, this debate focuses on whether a
price discrimination tie that does not lead to new monopoly power in the tied market
involves greater societal harms than benefits and, if so, whether antitrust tying law is the
proper means for policing such tie-ins. See supra note 178. There is agreement, however,
that a metering tie will be pro-competitive when it operates as a form of risk allocation
that the majority of buyers want. See supra note 180.
230. As with ties used to insure goodwill or quality control, there is a temporal aspect
to a claim that buyers favor a metering tie because it allocates risk in a way that they like.
Buyers preferences in this regard may change over time, and that possibility must be
taken into consideration when a party seeks to use evidence of the presence or absence of
coercion. See supra note 227.
231. In a similar fashion, evidence of widespread buyer coercion or widespread support
could conceivably be used where the tying seller admitted to employing a tie-in to evade
price controls but argued that, in doing so, he was surreptitiously cutting prices, not
padding them. While the tying seller obviously could (and no doubt would) present di-
rect evidence of the price cuts, he could also present evidence that the majority of buyers
saw the package as a desirable alternative. Such a tying arrangement, by effectively in-
creasing competition in the tying product market and lowering prices to consumers,
would be economically efficient. It might violate a price-control law or regulation, but it
would not violate the antitrust laws and would not be subject to antitrust attack by rival
sellers who were injured through loss of customers.
232. See supra note 224.
233. The decision on the plaintiff's standing, particularly in the sense of antitrust in-
jury, can be made at the outset of the case, after discovery, or even after evidence has
been taken at trial. Indeed, the decision on antitrust injury was made in Brunswick only
after the trial on the merits. See supra notes 96-101 and accompanying text.
234. Assuming a tie was successfully used to leverage into a position of monopoly
power in the tied market, all buyers would suffer antitrust injury in that all would pay a
monopolistic price for the tied product. See Hovenkamp, Tying Arrangements, supra
note 163, at 227. The buyers are thus in a position analogous to persons who buy from a
horizontal price-fixing cartel. See supra note 7.
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injure all buyers. Even if a particular price discrimination tie is deemed
to be socially harmful-in allowing a monopolist to exact greater monop-
oly profits-and even if this harm is considered a form of antitrust in-
jury, 35 the buyer who gets a lower price because of the price
discrimination certainly has not suffered antitrust injury 36 Similarly,
there may be instances in which a tying seller cannot show widespread
buyer support for a goodwill tie or a metering tie but can show that the
tying arrangement benefitted this particular plaintiff-buyer 3" In each of
these cases, evidence of the presence or absence of coercion-in this case,
individual coercion--can help determine whether the plaintiff-buyer has
herself been injured by the economically-inefficient aspect of the tie."~
Thus, as with vertical price, territory, and customer restraints, evi-
dence of the presence or absence of coercion continues to have an impor-
tant role in the analysis of tie-ins, even with the ascendancy of the
economic efficiency approach. Evidence of widespread coercion or wide-
spread agreement is directly relevant to a claim that the tying arrange-
ment is economically efficient in offering a desirable package or risk
allocation to buyers, or in providing valid goodwill protection for the
tying product. Furthermore, evidence of individual coercion is relevant
to the issue of a buyer's standing in certain cases where the tie-in is
deemed inefficient.
VI. THE POTENTIAL PROBLEMS OF INTRODUCING
COERCION EVIDENCE
Even assuming that under an economic efficiency approach coercion
evidence will be relevant in the analysis of vertical restraints and tying
arrangements, a skeptic may still ask: Should we reopen Pandora's box
and encourage a jury to consider an intangible factor such as coercion?" 9
235. See supra note 178.
236. Unless he can show an exclusionary effect on himself stemming from the price
discrimination, a rival seller in the tied market would also lack antitrust injury standing.
See Page, Antitrust Damages, supra note 50, at 495-96.
237. There may, for instance, be metering or goodwill ties that, when originally im-
posed, had widespread buyer support but whose support has dropped off because buyers
as a whole have become more sophisticated or the business climate has changed. See
supra notes 227, 230. The particular plaintiff-buyer, however, may be a member of the
dwindling minority of buyers who still wanted the tied package. In this case the plaintiff
would suffer no antitrust injury even if the tying arrangement was deemed illegal. In
these instances, the lack of antitrust injury is similar to a lack of causation standing. See
supra note 163.
238. The buyer alleging an inefficient tie is also going to have to show damages attribu-
table to the illegal tie-in. This can be difficult when the buyer has paid a premium price
for the tied product but, at the same time, a lower price for the tying product. See VII P.
Areeda, supra note 7, at 1459; P. Areeda & H. Hovenkamp, supra note 9, at c 340.4; see
also Crossland v. Canteen Corp., 711 F.2d 714, 722-23 (5th Cir. 1983) (tying claim fails
where plaintiff buyer does not show he could have bought tied product cheaper
elsewhere).
239. The question of whether the plaintiff has shown antitrust injury is presumably,
like all standing decisions, a matter for the court rather than the jury to decide. But see
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The fear is two-fold. First, there is the danger that the jury, despite in-
structions to the contrary, will have a natural tendency to equate coer-
cion with guilt. Having heard testimony from dealer after dealer that,
for instance, a manufacturer coerced them into accepting a vertical terri-
torial restriction, the jury might well conclude that the manufacturer was
indeed "guilty" of the non-crime of coercion and jump from that conclu-
sion to a finding of an antitrust violation with its treble damages.240 The
second fear of the skeptic is that if we allow coercion evidence to be used,
we are inevitably back to the old problem of asking the jury to delve into
a party's state of mind, and possibly that of non-parties, and to make
hair-splitting distinctions such as whether the acts constitute coercion or
merely vigorous persuasion.24'
While these are legitimate concerns, there are answers to them. With
respect to the first fear-the runaway jury-this is a possibility in any
lawsuit. The use of carefully crafted jury instructions and special jury
interrogatories may reduce the danger to a large extent. Furthermore,
state-of-mind evidence will not inevitably be a plaintiff's tool. The de-
fendant may well wish to introduce evidence of widespread agreement
and lack of coercion to show an efficient vertical restraint or tie-in.
With respect to the second fear-the jury's alleged inability to discern
mental states-one obvious response is that juries make these sorts of
determinations all the time, in all kinds of litigation.242 The real question
is whether our discomfort with state-of-mind evidence in antitrust
cases"' is sufficient to justify the wholesale exclusion of this clearly rele-
Rebel Oil Co. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 1990-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,258 (D. Nev.
1990), at 64,951 (suggesting that antitrust injury question might be question for jury). To
the extent a party used evidence of the presence or absence of coercion to reflect on the
standing issue, the judge rather than the jury would, thus, be called upon to delve into a
party's state of mind.
240. Phillip Areeda notes that following the Supreme Court's decision in Parke, Davis,
many judges wrote as if coercion were the gravamen of the § 1 vertical offense. See VIII
P. Areeda, supra note 57, at 1 1623.
241. The Eighth Circuit has specifically noted that a dealer-inspired vertical restraint
may have different economic significance than a dealer-coerced one. The dealer-inspired
restraint "may be fully consistent with a supplier's efforts to develop an efficient market-
ing strategy.... On the other hand, where the dealer forces upon an unwilling supplier
more restrictive intrabrand restraints than the supplier would have imposed in serving his
own interest in efficient distribution, there is a greater likelihood that the dealer is seeking
an anti-competitive advantage." Lomar Wholesale Grocery, Inc. v. Dieter's Gourmet
Foods, Inc., 824 F.2d 582, 594 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1010 (1988). In-
deed, the Eighth Circuit acknowledged that in the latter situation "a presumption of anti-
competitive effects.., might be justified." Id. Nonetheless, the court concluded that "as
an administrative matter this distinction would be very difficult to draw; the trier of fact
would need to distinguish between a dealer's strong suggestion and outright demand, and
between a supplier's willing acceptance and grudging acquiescence." Id.
242. In tort and criminal cases, for instance, juries are frequently called upon to deter-
mine if a party acted willfully, recklessly, or negligently.
243. A key difference between antitrust cases and tort cases is that antitrust liability
leads to treble damages. On the other hand, tort liability can result in punitive damages
and a criminal conviction can lead to imprisonment, either of which could be considered
at least as serious as treble damages.
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vant evidence. 2' In answering that question, moreover, we should not
assume that evidence of coercion or agreement will necessarily be "soft"
evidence about how a person's stomach felt when asked to do something.
Instead, evidence of coercion or agreement is often found in internal
memoranda, correspondence between the parties, or testimony reporting
a party's response to a grievance or complaint. 245 We also need to re-
member that, even if a court were to exclude coercion or agreement evi-
dence offered to show the presence or absence of a cartel or an efficient or
inefficient tie-in, a jury might still be called on to make subtle state-of-
mind distinctions, such as whether one party coerced (as opposed to per-
suaded) another party.246 Finally, in assessing the jury's ability to judge
mental states, one must ask whether this task is really more difficult than
asking a jury of laypersons to determine such "hard facts" as what the
proper market is, whether a party has market power in that market, and
whether loss of intrabrand competition is outweighed by an increase in
interbrand competition. 247 When all these factors are considered, coer-
244. Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, relevant evidence may be excluded only if
"its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confu-
sion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." Fed. R. Evid. 403.
245. Phillip Areeda suggests, for instance, that dealer coercion of a manufacturer
might be shown by evidence such as: (1) the relative power of the respective parties; (2)
dealer initiatives; (3) the scope and form of the restraint; and (4) the intentions of the
respective parties. See VIII P. Areeda, supra note 57, at 1604g; see also Tire Sales Corp.
v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 637 F.2d 467, 473-74 (7th Cir. 1980) (discussing type of evidence
that can be used to show coercion in tying case), cert denied, 451 U.S. 920 (1981).
246. As long as the Supreme Court adheres to its Monsanto decision, juries will actu-
ally have to distinguish three states of mind: (1) coerced compliance (which is not an
"agreement" and therefore not subject to antitrust attack); (2) persuasion (which is simi-
larly considered unilateral action and therefore legal); and (3) agreement (which is ille-
gal). See supra notes 84-92 and accompanying text; see also Isaksen v. Vermont Castings,
Inc., 825 F.2d 1158, 1163-64 (7th Cir. 1987) (unwilling compliance not enough for agree-
ment, but dealer need not show contractual-type agreement) (opinion by Judge Richard
Posner), cerL denied, 486 U.S. 1005 (1988); McCabe's Furniture, Inc. v. La-Z-Boy Chair
Co., 798 F.2d 323, 328 (8th Cir. 1986) (discussing type of circumstantial evidence that
might be sufficient to show that manufacturer was not acting independently), cert. denied,
486 U.S. 1005 (1988). The persuasion/agreement dichotomy is not a new one. Even
before Monsanto, courts uniformly held that persuasion (without coercion) was not an
"agreement" for purposes of vertical restraints. See supra note 40.
In tying arrangements, moreover, courts and juries frequently have to make a persua-
sion/coercion distinction in determining if the two products are linked. See Murphy v.
Business Cards Tomorrow, Inc., 854 F.2d 1202, 1204 (9th Cir. 1988); Unijax, Inc. v.
Champion Int'l., Inc., 683 F.2d 678, 685-86 (2d Cir. 1982); General Motors Corp. v.
Gibson Chem. & Oil Corp., 661 F. Supp. 567, 570 (E.D.N.Y. 1987); supra note 210.
247. All of these questions must be answered by a jury trying a rule of reason case that
involves a non-price vertical restraint. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.,
433 U.S. 36, 52 (1977); Ball Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Mutual Hosp. Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d
1325, 1334-37 (7th Cir. 1986); Graphic Prods. Distribs., Inc. v. Itek Corp., 717 F.2d
1560, 1568-69 (11th Cir. 1983). Indeed, some commentators have questioned whether,
given the complexity of the rule of reason case for non-price vertical restraints, a jury is
capable of making the determination. See, e.g., Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements,
supra note 53, at 153-55 ("It is fantastic to suppose that judges (and juries) could carry
out the evaluation entailed in such a search."); Gerhart, The "Competitive Advantages"
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cion or agreement evidence, which may be relevant to the plaintiff's case
or to the defense, is simply not so amorphous or malleable that it should
be excluded altogether.
A skeptic might also legitimately ask: Why bother with coercion evi-
dence? Why not require, in the case of vertical restraints, direct proof of
a horizontal interbrand cartel, and, in a tying case, direct proof of a mo-
nopoly in the tied market (or some other economic inefficiency)? The
answer is that while such direct proof is certainly preferable, it is not
always readily available. Either the plaintiff or the defendant may find it
easier to muster a showing of widespread dealer coercion or widespread
dealer agreement as some circumstantial evidence to support its case.24
Furthermore, as long as the Supreme Court continues to treat vertical
antitrust violations as separate and distinct from horizontal restraints
(and tying claims as separate from monopolization and attempted mo-
nopolization claims),249 as is likely, a plaintiff ought not be required to
prove the existence of a cartel250 or that a new monopoly has been cre-
ated. The issue is whether the plaintiff has shown an economically ineffi-
cient restraint-an issue on which coercion evidence may be directly
relevant.
CONCLUSION
Coercion has had an uneven influence in antitrust analysis. It has
never played a part in any aspect of the analysis of horizontal restraints,
but it had a central role in the early vertical restraint and tying cases.
Coercion was key to the rationale for condemning these restraints; it fac-
tored prominently into the agreement element, even providing proof of
an agreement in vertical restraints; and, it guaranteed a plaintiff standing
in the in pari delicto sense. Since 1977, however, all that changed when
Explanation For Intrabrand Restraints: An Antitrust Analysis, 1981 Duke L.J. 417, 438-39
("the rule-of-reason standard generally applied gives the jury wide discretion to arrive at
its own assessment of competitive effects"); Posner, The Next Step, supra note 59, at 15
("The vagueness of the [rule-of-reason] standard might not be an insuperable objection
... if antitrust cases were decided by highly experienced and knowledgeable judges spe-
cializing in antitrust cases. They are not, however. They are decided by juries consisting
of laymen .... "); see also Roszkowski, The Sad Legacy of GTE Sylvania and Its "Rule of
Reason" The Dealer Termination Cases and The Demise of Section 1 of the Sherman Act,
22 Conn. L. Rev. 129, 156-60 (1989) (arguing that rule-of-reason standard is incapable of
judicial application). In a tying case the jury is potentially asked equally difficult ques-
tions concerning the "hard" facts, such as: Has the defendant shown a dollar savings by
producing and marketing the two products as a package? In what way will the quality of
the tying product be enhanced by the requirement that the buyer take the tied product?
Does this metering tie in fact produce an advantageous allocation of risks for the buyer?
248. The coercion or agreement evidence might not be sufficient by itself to prove or
disprove the plaintiff's case. See supra notes 134, 223.
249. See supra notes 112, 213.
250. A plaintiff-consumer, for instance, may introduce widespread coercion evidence
showing that dealers engaged in group activity that, while not sufficient to be caught by
the horizontal rules, had a cartel-like effect and resulted in inefficient vertical restraints.
See VIII P. Areeda, supra note 57, at 1604e.
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the Supreme Court began moving toward an economic efficiency ap-
proach to antitrust. Having concluded that the horizontal effects of verti-
cal restraints and tie-ins were the economically inefficient ones, the Court
began applying a horizontally-based analysis in vertical and tying ar-
rangements. In particular, the Court jettisoned the old trader-freedom
rationale for judging these restraints and, in doing so, seemingly dis-
carded coercion altogether from the antitrust calculus of vertical re-
straints and severely curtailed it in tying arrangements. The Court
redefined the vertical agreement in horizontal "common plan" terms,
and it developed an antitrust injury standing requirement that incorpo-
rated the new non-coercive rationale for judging restraints.
In its haste to move from the trader-freedom rationale to an economic
efficiency approach, however, the Court made a fundamental mistake-it
wrongly assumed that if coercion were eliminated from the rationale for
condemning vertical and tying restraints, then, as in horizontal arrange-
ments, coercion would have no role whatsoever to play in the legal analy-
sis of these restraints. What the Court overlooked was that vertical
restraints are fundamentally different from horizontal ones. The two-
level nature of vertical and tying restraints makes coercion an inevitable
factor in many of these arrangements. Despite the Court's suggestion to
the contrary, evidence of the presence or absence of coercion in vertical
and tying arrangements cannot and should not be disregarded merely
because the trader-freedom rationale has been replaced with an economic
efficiency approach. While coercion is no longer the reason for con-
demning these restraints, the presence of coercion or agreement-partic-
ularly widespread coercion or agreement-can be important evidence in
sorting out efficient restraints from inefficient ones. Additionally, with
both vertical restraints and tying arrangements, coercion can be useful in
casting light on the plaintiff's claim to antitrust injury standing.
This does not mean that coercion evidence is relevant in all vertical
restraint and tying cases. As outlined in this article, a court needs to
consider what party is seeking to use coercion evidence and what type of
claim is being asserted or defended against. In some instances, coercion
or agreement evidence will be irrelevant; in other instances, it will be
relevant but not conclusive in and of itself. That, however, is no reason
to discard such evidence altogether. Frequently, coercion or agreement
evidence will be directly relevant to the fundamental issue in the case: Is
this an economically efficient restraint? Both the plaintiff and the defend-
ant should have the opportunity to use this evidence.
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